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In many developing countries, households rely  charcoalwood, or only about 2 percent of the
heavily on woodfuels (firewood and charcoal) as  selling price of the finished products.
their main source of energy for cooking and
heating. The intemal trade in woodfuels is often  By charging an adequate fee for these wood
sizable.  resources, Openshaw and Feinstein argue,
woodfuels production and consumption can be
In Africa alone the annual value of traded  made more efficient.  In addition, governments
fuclwood and charcoal is probably more than  would be better able to finance the investments
US$2 billion - and the annual total "value" of  in their forest sector that are needed to maintain
wood products (including self-collected fuel-  a regular fuelwood supply and to prevent long-
wood) may be about $6 billion to $8 billion.  term environmcntal damage.
Yet few governments are aware of wood-  Openshaw and Feinstein outline the methods
fuels' importance - and few recoup more than  energy planners can use to estimate fuelwood
a small fraction of the value of raw wood mate-  values and discuss several problems that arise in
rial grown on public lands.  assessing and collecting fuelwood stumpage
fees.
African governments now collect stumpage
fees of $30 million a year for fuelwood and
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Fuelwood is a major source of energy for households in many
developing countries.  It accounts  for a significant  portion of national
energy  consumption, and  is  most  generally supplied  in  the  form  of
firewood  or  charcoal.  Ir  low-income Africa,  up  to  90  percent  of
households use fuelwood.  There is an active trade in wood products, and
thousands  of  people  are  involved  in  processing,  distribution  and
marketing.  Yet few governments collect more  than small fraction of the
total traded value  of wood products.
This paper discusses the economic justification for charging
for wood resources  and the effects of considering  wood on the stump as a
"free  good".  It  reviews a  number of methods that can  be  used  for
estimating  stumpage value,  1/  and  the  advantages  and  disadvantages
associated with each.  It examines a model fuelwood pricing system and
briefly  explores  other  types  of  forest  revenue  systems.  Finally,
examples are provided  of fuelwood  stumpage  practices  in use in developing
countries today.
The discussion of fuelwood pricing should be useful for both
forestry economists, who must  identify the best ways  to manage their
nation's wood resources,  and to household energy planners, who use data
on  fuelwood prices when  comparing the costs and benefits of  use  of
fuelwood with use of alternative fuels, the relative  costs and benefits
of improved  and unimproved  charcoal  stoves,  etc.
Many of the examples  used in this paper are taken from studies
made by World Bank household energy economists in Africa.  The examples
are intended  as illustrations  only.  The paper  goes only briefly  into the
derivation of  stumpage values using actual field data.  This is done
deliberately,  as very little data exists that has been collected over a
sufficient  period  of  time  using  rigorous scientific methods.  The
Hlousehold  Energy Unit is planning extensive research in the areas of
fuelwood pricing,  and will publish  its findings  in future  papers.
Definition  of Terms
The terms "stumpage fee," "stumpage  value,"  "royalty"  and even
"stumpage tax" are often used interchangeably  in natural resource and
forestry  economics, both  in  the  literature and  in  the  field.  The
substitution of one term for the other often causes confusion.  In the
interest of  clarity, the terms, as they are used in  this paper, are
defined below:
- Stumpage fee is the financial  concept  of the value of standing
wood resources.  It is  the compensation  the owner  of the wood
1/  Stumpage is defined  as "the value of a standing  tree".-2-
receives  in exchange  for  surrendering  ownership  and  the  rights
of harvest. Although  the  stumpage  fee  is  market-determined,  it
may be implied  rather  than  stated,  and  may  be paid in-kind  or
by barter  instead  of  in  cash. (When  arriving  at stumpage  fees,
this paper looks at the value of wood as a raw material,
particularly  as a fuel,  and  not  at  the  value  of  the  forest  as a
whole as a source  of shelter,  food,  grazing,  scenic  beauty,
etc. The  term  stumpage  fee  will  be  used  when  talking  about  the
sale  of  wood  from  the  standing  tree).
- Stumpage  value  is  the  economic  concept  of the  worth  to society
of a  unit of wood resource,  estimated  using the economic
concepts  of  real resource (opportunity)  costs and  shadow
(efficiency)  prices. While  estimates  of stumpage  value  may be
based  on observed  transactions  or may be  mathematically  equal
to  stumpage  fees,  they  are  not  dictated  by  the  market.
- Stumpage  royalty  ("royalty")  has  a historic  meaning  of a sum  of
money  due to  a country's  ruler  (the  royal  person  or sovereign)
for  the  use  of forest  resources  belonging  to the  Crown.  Fees
were paid for the use of  the forest resources,  such as
firewood,  wood for  construction,  or land  for  grazing. Later,
natural  forests  were  managed,  trees  planted  as a crop,  and a
stumpage  fee  charged  when  the  trees  were  sold. Present-day  use
of the  term  "royalty"  refers  to  payments  extracted  by a public
authority  (the  "Government")  in exchange  for  use  of a tree  on
public  land.  Usually  the  term  is reserved  for  products  taken
from  unmanaged  natural  woodlands  or  forests,  whereas  a stumpage
fee is collected  from  the  sale  of trees  from  managed  forests,
whether  managed  by governments  or  by  private  individuals.  This
distinction  adds  little  to  clarity  and  will  not  be  made in  this
paper.
Other fees or taxes may be charged  in connection  with the
cutting  of wood,  such  as  an entry  fee,  a cutting  permit,  an  extraction  or
removal  fee, and  a product  tax.  These  fees  or taxes  are  all connected
with the  exploitation  of raw  material  and  will  be  explained  when  they  are
mentioned  in  the  text.
Stumpage  Fees  and  Taxes
It is important  to  point  out  that  a stumpage  fee  (whether  it  is
called  a fee  or a royalty)  is  not  a  tax,  even  though  some  forest  services
may  call it  a stumpage  tax. The stumpage  fee  is the  reward  to the  owner
of the (tree)  resource  or the  compensation  for  the  use  of the  resource.
A comparison  can be made  with payment  for  maize  to a farmer  or payment
for  oil to  the  owner  of the  oil. Maize  farmers  expect  to  be compensated,
in the form  of an acceptable  maize  price,  for their  crop.  If a maize
product  tax  was  substituted  for  a maize  product  price,  no private  farmer
would be willing to grow maize.  Owners of oil also expect to be
compensated  when oil is removed  from  the well.  Just because  oil and
other  natural  resources  such  as coal,  trees,  minerals,  etc.,  have little
or  no production  costs,  they  should  not  be considered  as free  goods.-3-
I.  ECONOMICS  OF FUELVOOD  FEE SYSTEMS
1.1  The collection  of a stumpage  fee from the resource  user  is
difficult. Trees  are  not  a concentrated  resource. Even if they  grow  in
a dense  forest  brea,  there  are  millions  of production  units,  each  with  a
different  value,  depending  on species,  size,  the  part  of the  tree  (trunk,
branches,  twigs),  etc.  This is why many forest  services,  and a  few
private  owners  as well,  traditionally  have  allowed  individuals  to collect
fuelwood  without  charge  provided  it  is  for  their  own  use.
1.2  Today  the  areas  of completely  natural  forests  or woodlands  are
rapidly disappearing and  government forest services and  private
individuals  are  spending  money  on the  growing  and  management  of the  wood
resource. When  wood resources  are  not  managed,  they  tend to  be treated
as depletable.  As a consequence,  many  areas  that  were  once  covered  with
forests  have  been  denuded  as individuals  removed  the  wood  without  thought
of replacing  it.  If trees  are to a renewable  resource,  available  for
future  generations  as well  as for  the  present  one,  then  investments  have
to be  made in  replanting  and  managing  the  forest  areas.
1.3  As populations  have increased  in size and large  numbers  of
people  have  moved  to the  cities,  becoming  part  of the  monetary  economy,
woodfuels have  increasingly  become an  internally  traded commodity.
Residents of many Third World cities now regularly  purchase their
woodfuel  supply.  Like electricity  or gas consumers  in the industrial
world's  households,  few  woodfuel  end-users  take time  to think  how many
people--landowner,  harvester,  marketer,  transporter, distributor,
wholesaler,  retailer--are  involved  in bringing  their  woodfuel  to them.
Very few know or care where the wood comes from, for example from
privately  owned ("freehold")  land or traditional  tribal  land,  but few
would dispute  the proposition  that the owner of these  wood resources
should  receive  a fair  share  or  "cut"  of  the  final  retail  price.
1.4  Yet  many  developing  country  governments  charge  only  a small  fee
or even no fee at all for  wood from  unmanaged  government  or commanal
land,  especially  if  it is  for  household  use. So,  many  people  assume  that
wood  for  fuel  from  these  lands  should  be free. However,  any  raw  material
or service,  if  it is  of  use,  has  a  value. In theory,  consumers  should  be
willing  to pay for its  use.  Whether  it is practical  to charge  for it
depends  on a number  of things  such as the cost  of the  material, the
expense  of collecting  payment,  the  cost,  availability  and acceptability
of  substitute products, the  value  of  the  end  product and  the
acceptability  of  the  charge  to  the  prospective  consumer.
1.5  Farmers  who want to clear  land for  agriculture  may consider
trees  a nuisance  ratter  than  a resource,  and  wonder  why they  should  pay
for something  that  is  a liability  to them. However,  in  nearly  all  cases
the woody biomass  does have a value:  it could  be turned  into poles,
fuelwood  or charcoal. The  cost  of clearing  the  land  could  be  more than
recovered  from  sale  of these  products. Even  if  the  wood  is  burnt  on siteit still is providing  nutrients  tc the soil that will increase  soil
fertility  for  the  first  year.  In  a  .h  cases,  a charge  should  be imposed
to make sure  that  the  wood resource  is not  wasted. However,  the  person
who clears  the land  will need information  about  markets  and prices  for
forest  products. Often,  wood resources  are  wasted  because  of a lack  of
market  intelligence.
Economic  Justification  for  Stumpage  Fees
Problems  of  Open  Access
1.6  What is the  basic  economic  argument  for  charging  fees  for  wood
taken from public lands? The  economic justification  for a  public
authority  to charge  for  resources  lies  in the so-called  "Tragedy  of the
Commons"  which  C. Hardin  dramatically  depicted  in  an  article  published  in
the  magazine  Science  in 1968.  2/  Hardin  attributed  the inefficient  and
wasteful  management  of  many  natural resource systems  such  as
international  fisheries  or  medieval  European  forests  to  a lack  of clearly
divided,  assignable  interests  in  the  resource.  Ax ording  to  the  standard
"common property  resource"  paradigm,  without owne.ship  there are no
incentives  for husbanding  the resource. Attitudes  of users to these
systems  can be summed  up in such phrases  as, "Everybody's  property  is
nobody's  property";  "get  it  before  it's  gone";  "why  should  I save  it,  if
my neighbors  will just  use it up?"  These  phrases  evoke  the individual
user's feeling  of helplessness  as no one individual  can manage the
resource  rationally  without  the  cooperation  of all the  others. In this
situation,  there is a  tendency  for each individual  to overuse the
resource,  to  use  it  up too  fast,  or  even  destroy  a  normally  self-renewing
system.
1.7  While the term "common  property  resource"  is traditional  in
economics,  the  legal  profession  has  long  recognized  finer  distinctions  in
the management  structure  of resource  systems.  Common property  (res
comnunes)  as developed  in English  common  law  (it  exists  also in ancient
Roman  and German  law) refers  to a distribution  of property  rights  in a
resource  system  where  a well-defined  set  of users  enjoy  a well-defined
(but not necessarily  equal) right to use the  resource,  while all
potential  users  not  belonging  to that  set  are  excluded. Ciriacy-Wantrup
and Bishop  (1975)  document  that  under  such systems  of property  rights,
many natural  resource  systems  have been well managed  on a sustainable
basis  for  hundreds  of years.  Examples  include  the  hunting  resources  of
various  tribal  peoples,  the  English  and  Welsh  commons,  the  Alpine  meadows
of Switzerland,  and  the  areas  of  Somalia  and  Kenya  where  frankincense  and
myrrh  are  collected.
1.8  Legal terminology  also recognizes  a  second  common property
resource  management  institution,  the res  nullius  or "unowned  resources"
2/  G. Hardin,  "The  Tragedy  of the Commons,"  Science,  vol. 162, 1968,
pp.  1243-1248.-5-
system. Resource  economists,  recognizing  its significance  for  resource
management  policy,  have termed  this  subset  "open  access"  common  property
resources. Examples  of  both  common  property  regimes  may  be  readily  found
in the forest  and woodland  resources  of many  developing  countries. The
further  identification  and  study  of such  systems  in  Third  World  contexts
is  a rich  field  for  research.
1.9  Regardless of  the  terminology employed, two  conditions
characterize  the  "common  property  resource  problem":
(a) Unrestricted  access  to the resource  system  by all those  who
care  to  use  it;  and
(b)  Some  type  of adverse  interaction  among  the  users  of  the  system.
If  free  access  can  be lenied,  then  appropriate  management  of the  resource
can be exercised  by the party  denying  access.  If there  is no adverse
interaction  among  users,  there  is no reason  to deny  access. In either
case there would be no resources  management  problem.  The ensuing
discussions  will  focus  on  open  access  fuelwood  resources.
Market  Failure
1.10  Resource  economists  argue  that the  free  access  nature  of many
fuelwood  resources  contributes  to the  problem  of assuring  a sustainable
supply  of woodfuels. In economic  terms,  what  happens  is called  "market
failure." This is not a comment  on the  presence  or absence  of markets
for goods and services.  In cases  of market  failure,  markets  are not
doing  their  job  of  assuring  efficient  production  and  consumption  of goods
and  services. Two  kinds  of  market  failure  apply  in the  case  of fuelwood
resources:
(a) Non-recognition  of  user  costs;  and
(b) Effects  on  other  sectors  (externalities)  of  woodfuel
consumption
1.11  Non  Recognition  of  User  Costs. Participants  in  a  modern  market
economy follow a  basic rule regulating  their consumption:  Their
willingness  to part  with their  wage  earnings  in exchange  for  goods  (and
services)  is directly  proportional  to  the  additional  benefits  they  expect
to receive  from obtaining  those  goods  and ser-ices.  Consumers  buy a
given good until the marginal  benefit received  from the last ULit
purchased  in just  equel  to the  marginal  cost  of  acquiring  it  in terms  of
money  foregone. Further  purchases  of that  good  would  waste  income  that
could be applied  to buy quantities  of other desired  goodu providing
higher  incremental  benefit.  Reverse  reasoning  explains  why purchasing
less  of that  good would  also be suboptimal.  By following  the  marginal
benefit equals marginal cost rule, consumers (quite unconsciously)
maximize  the total  benefit  received  from spending  the fruits  of their
labor.-6-
1.12  A villager,  a  woodcutter  or  a charcoal  maker  respond  to similar
economic  signals  guiding  their  production  and  consutption  decisions. In
the case of the decision  to cut a tree,  the choice  can be modeled  as
follows.  On the marginal  benefit  side,  the wood harvester  obtains  a
certain  unit value of fuel for cooking,  firewood  for cash sale, or
feedstock  for charcoal  making.  But  what marginal  costs  does the wood
harvester  face? We consider  two  cases:  (a)  The  "pri ate"  case  where  the
cutter  owns the  tree  because  he owns  the  land  under  it  or  has purchased
harvest  rights;  and (b) The "open  access"  case in which entry  to the
woodland  or forest  is  free  to  all.
1.13  The exploiter  of a private  stock  of wood faces two costs.
First is the  marginal  extraction  cost,  i.e.,  felling  the tree,  cross-
cutting  and splitting,  hauling,  and  stacking. This is  usually  expressed
as a marginal  opportunity  cost  of the  harvester's  labor  which  could  have
been  applied  to  other  productive  activities.
1.14  The  second is termed the marginal  user cost (also called
"scarcity  rent") and represents  the cost of consuming  a  tree today
instead  of in the future.  This user cost may be subdivided  into two
distinct  components:  The loss  of future  wood  resources,  and the loss  of
growing  stock:
(a) The loss  of  future  resources  applies  to  both  exhaustible  (e.g.,
oil) and  renewable  (e.g.,  tree)  resources.  One  can  think  of a
stock  of standing  trees  as money  in the  bank.  The  value  of a
bank  deposit  increases  over  time  ("interest")  as a "reward"  for
deferring  consumption;  the  value  of a fixed  stock  of standing
trees  or of oil in the ground  also increases  over time  at a
rate  determined  by the  strength  of preferences  for  present  vs.
future  consumption. If this opportunity  cost  did not exist,
there  would  be strong  incent;ves  to cut  and sell  every  tree  in
order  to  invest  the  sales  receipts  in the  bank.  3/
(b) The loss  of growing  stock  applies  only to renewable  resources
and represents  the  loss  of increases  in  resource  stocks  due  to
biological  growth. Thus,  assuming  the  tree  has  not  yet reached
the mature  phase of its life,  a decision  to harvest today
sacrifices  future  gains  due  to  growth.
Depending  on how a country's  wood  resources  are managed  in relation  to
wood demand, the sum of cost components  (a) and (b) may  increase,
decrease  or remain  constant  over time.  In the optimal  steady  state
scenario  of long-term  sustainable  forest  exploitation,  the  marginal  user
3/  This  is  Hotelling's  arbitrage  opportunity.-7-
cost is constant  but nositive,  reflecting  a constant  level of wood
resource  scarcity.  4/
1.15  The marginal  costs  faced  by a harvester  of open acces,  wood
resources  are  quite  different  from  the  private  case  above. The  marginal
extraction  costs  are still  present,  whether  measured  in personal  labor
costs or in payments  to woodcutters.  But the user costs are not
recognized  by an individual  exploiter  because  of insecurity  of tenure.
As each  tree  [potentially]  belongs  to  everybody  and  anybody,  there  are  no
guarantees  and much  uncertainty  that  a tree  left  standing  today  will be
left to grow and be available  for  a particular  indiv.dual's  harvest  in
the  future.
1.16  In addition,  each tree  removed  by, say,  a charcoaler  makes  it
more difficult  to obt n wood  supplies  in the future. This  is true  not
just for the one charcoaler  (private  cost),  but for all charcoalers
dependent  on the  wood  resource  (iicial  cost). Thus,  private  tree  cutting
in open  access  forests  affects  all  woodfuel  users  in a way  which  is not
factored  into the individual  charcoaler's  wood  harvest  decisions. And,
since  private  costs  are  lower  than  social  costs,  the  rate  of  wood  cutting
will  be  higher  than  socially  desirable.
1.17  This type of adverae interaction  between users of  freely
available  but limited  resources  is known  as a "congestion  externality."
The same  analysis  applies  to  why  fish  in  the  ocean  are  over-exploited,  or
why  many  uncontrolled-access  highways  are  congested.
1.18  Effects  on Other  Sectors (intersectoral  externalities).  This
is the  second  type  of  market  failure. An externality  (effect  on a third
party)  exists  when  third  parties  are  affected  in  a way  that  is  not  taken
into account  in the transaction  between  the  buyer  and the seller. An
example  of this  is pollution.  Suppose  that  a beer  brewery  is downstream
from a  fertilizer  factory.  The factory  dumps pollutants  into the
stream.  The brewer,  who takes  water  from the  polluted  stream,  has to
purify  it before  it can  be used  to make  beer.  This  imposes  extra  costs
on the  brewer  and  raises  the  price  of beer. Yet  the  farmers  who  buy  the
fertilizer  pay the same  price for it whether  the factory  pollutes  the
stream  or not.  Economists  would  say  that too  much fertilizer  is being
produced,  and  not  enough  beerl
4/  The  user  cost  could  be  negative  in  an "over-forested"  region  located
a long  way from  centers  of wood consumption. If there  are  higher
value opportunities  for use of the land than tree growing,  this
leads to rationally  motivated  short-term  tree "mining."  On the
other hand, a  country undergoing  rapid deforestation,  such as
Mauritania  in the dry Sahel,  experiences  positive  and increasing
user  costs  over  time.- 8  -
1.19  Externalities  from fuelwood  exploitation  are often  the result
of  linkages between sectors  of the economy that depend on natursl
resources.  These  effects  might  include:
(a) Loss of agricultural  productivity,  as a result  of increased
moisture  evaporation  and/or  soil  depletion  following
uncontrolled  fuelwood  harvesting;
(b) Loss of hydroele.tric  supply  potential,  as a result  of soil
erosion,  loss  of  watershed  capacity  and  siltation  of  dams;
(c) Loss  of  public  water  supply  potential,  similar  to (b)  above;
Cd) Loss of other forest  products,  in which the destruction  of
woodlands  may  cause  a local  scarcity  of  game,  medicinal  plants,
raw  materials  such  as  hardwood  or  bamboo  used  to  make  artisanal
products,  undergrowth  for grazing,  and other products  and
amenities  derived  from  the  forest;  and
(e) Loss  of carbon  dioxide  fixing  ability,  which  has  been  observed
on a global  scale  when forests  are  destroyed  and is one cause
of the  so-called  "greenhouse  effect."
1.20  These  externalities  are  often evaluated for  cost-benefit
purposes  by placing  a value  on the  foregone  benefits. For  ezample,  loss
of hydroelectric  potential  could  be valued  by estimating  the loss of
productive  life  span  of  the  hydro  dam  in  years. Multiplying  the  years  by
the average  annual  value  of electricity  output  gives  a monetary  figure
for the loss.  Another  way to  measure  externalities  is in terms  of the
preventative  costs,  or the costs  of restoring  whatever  has been lost.
For  example,  one  can  approximate  the  cost  of lost  topsoil  by the  cost  of
the artificial  fertilizers  needed  to restore  the lost soil fertility.
Wnatever  estimation  technique  is used,  a negative  externality  implies
that the  social  cost  of fuelwood  consumption  is  greater  than  the  private
cost,  and  that  too  much  wood  cutting  is  going  on.
Conclusions  From  Market  Failure
1.21  The main conclusion  to be drawn from the above  analysis  of
market  failures  is  that  open  access  fuelwood  resources  are  underpriced  or
undervalued  relative  to their  worth  to society. Some  of the  effects  of
this  underpricing  are  discussed  in  following  paragraphs.
1.22  Over  Consumption  of Fuelwood.  An axiom  of consumer  behavior  is
that the chcaper  a good  is priced,  the  more  of it will  be consumed.  5/
Note that "overconsumption"  in this context  means that the marginal
social  cost of woodfuels  consumption,  as measured  by the concepts  of
5/  This  axiom  does  not  apply  to Giffen  goods,  of which  fuelvood  is  not
observed  to  be  one.- 9  -
marginal extraction,  user and  external  costs, is greater than the
marginal  social  benefit.  6/  Overconsumption  is an economic  comment  of
the efficiency  of  fuelvood  production  and consumption,  not a  value
judgement  reflecting  a desire  to keep woodfuel  dependent  consumers  in
"energy  poverty."
1.23  The  overconsumption  argument is  often  challenged  on  two
grounds. The  first  is  that  the  real  price  of  woodfuels  in  many  countriea
has stayed  relatively  constant  or even  decreased.  This  finding  seems  to
contradict  claims of  underpricing,  overconsumption  and  approaching
scarcity  and  suggests  that  supply  and  demand  may  be in  long-term  balance
in spite of population  pressures.  However,  some observers,  notably
Barnes  (unpublished  draft),  have observed  that  woodfuel  markets  tend to
maintain  constant  real  prices  until  the  onset  of  scarcity,  when  they  rise
very quickly  to a higher  price  plateau.  The reasons  for this price
behavior  are  not  clear.  but  we can  make  an  educated  guess  that:
(a)  Initially,  the  supply  of  fuelwood  is  elastic  as land  is  cleared
for  agriculture  and/oe  woodcutters  chop  into  the  standing  stock
of "fuelwood"  trees.  As wood capital  becomes  depleted,  the
supply  becomes  more  inelastic  and  real  prices  rise.
(b) The price of backstop  fuels  (principally  kerosene),  consumer
transition  to lower  quality  but less expensive  fuels (e.g.,
twigs,  agricultural  residues,  dung),  and the long run supply
response  from plantations  and distant  (formerly  sub-marginal)
natural  forest  stands  all  work  to  put  a cap  on price  rises.
(c)  Imperfect  flow of information  in woodfuel  markets  may also
contribute  to  the  abruptness  of the  price  transition.
1.24  The second  challenge  to the overconsumption  argument  is that
woodfuels pricing has  little effect on quantities  demanded  because
woodfuels  demand is inelastic,  particularly  in the poorest  countries
where few alternatives  to woodfuels  are available  in the short run
because  of poor  distribution  of modern  fuels. This  criticism  does serve
to point  out  some  of the  limitations  of pricing  policy,  but  it overlooks
the  following  points:
(a) There  is often  a considerable  difference  in  long  run  vs. short
run  energy  demand  elasticities,  with  consumers making
adjustments  over long time periods  that cannot  be detected
through  short-term observation.  Long  lead  times  are
characteristic  of the woodfuels  sector,  with both fuelwood
shortages  and  supply  enhancement  measures  (e.g.,  tree  planting)
occurring  over  long  periods.  Furthermore,  underpricing  of  wood
resources is  a  disincentive  to  infrastructure  investments
required  to sustain  long  term  transitions  to  modern  fuels.
6/  Irrespective  of market  failure,  in some  fuelwood  markets  the  retail
price  may  nevertheless  reflect  full  economic  costs  due  to  middlemen
capturing  high  economic  rents. See  paragraph  1.28.- 10  -
(b)  While  household  demand  for  cooking  services  may be inelastic,
successful  stove projects  demonstrate  that the demand for
woodfuels  may  be  made  more  elastic.  Carefully  designed  cooking
efficiency  programs,  especially  for  urban  areas  where  consumers
are dependent  on charcoal,  could  help consumers  lower  cooking
costs  and thus  partly  offset  the  impacts  of realistic  fuelwood
pricing policies.  And also, these same pricing policies
provide  consumers  incentives  to  adopt  fuel-saving  stoves.
1.25  Wastage and Inefficient  Transformation. Where fuelwood  is
converted to  charcoal for  transport to  distant urban  markets,
underpricing of  wood  resources encourages inefficient  charcoaling
practices  and  wasting  of wood.  Paying  only  a fraction  of the  true  cost
of his input,  the  charcoaler  has  little  or no incentive  to economize  on
the  use of wood.  Similarly,  the  underpricing  of wood from  open access
forestlands  limits the  incentives  for  adoption of  improved wood
harvesting  practices  and  charcoal  kilns  in  those  areas.
1.26  An example  from the trial  introduction  of improved  charcoal
kilns  in Jamaica  illustrates  the incentive  effect  economic  wood pricing
could have.  The selected  improved  kiln type,  the Casamance  modified
earth  mound,  has a chimney  made from  three  used  oil drums.  Estimated
cost for  the chimney is about US$30 (Jamaican  $160).  This is a
significant  investment  for  traditional  charcoalers.  Demonstrations
involving  30 local charcoalers  confirmed  that the financial  rate of
return  the  producer  expects  to make  governs  his  willingness  to make the
initial  capital  investment.  Table  1.1  shows  the  financial  incentives  to
the charcoaler  of using  the  Casamance  rather  than  the traditional  kiln.
The incentives  were estimated  by calculating  the  producer's  margin,  or
producer  price  less  charcoal  production  costs,  at  varying  wood  prices.
Table  1.1: CHARCOAL  PRODUCERS'  '4ARGIN:  JAMAICA
(JS/Tonne)
Kiln  Type
Wood  Cost  Traditional  Casamance
0  139  205
5  105  180
10  72  155
25  -28  80
50  -195  -45
Source: "Jamaica  Charcoal  Production  Project,"  UNDP/World
Bank report  090/88,  September,  1988.
1.27  The  table  shows  that  if  the  producer  is  paying  nothing  for  wood
input,  the  level  of "profit"  per  tonne  is  close  to  50  percent  higher  with
the use of the Casamance  kiln.  However,  if wood costs  just J$10 per- 11 -
tonne  (less  than  US$2  per  tonne)  then  the  improved  kiln  yields  more  than
double  the  profit  of  the  traditional  method.
1.28  Transfer  of Rents  to Urban  Consumers  and  Middlemen. In many
developing  countries,  urban  fuelwood  and  charcoal  demand  accounts  for  30-
50 percent  of all  woodfuel  demand. As  many  formerly  wooded  areas  are  not
replanted  or managed  to ensure  regeneration  of trees,  a net transfer  of
resources  from the country  to the city takes  place.  This increases
poverty  in rural  areas  and  eventually  leads  to  urban  migration,  resulting
in even  greater  urban  woodfuel  demand. Thus  the  economic  rent  from  tree
production  is transferred  from rural dwellers,  or the government,  to
urban  consumers. If the  woodfuel  marketing  and  transport  sector  is  not
organized competitively  these rents may  be effectively  captured by
middlemen.
1.29  Disincentive  for  Tree  Planting.  Wood  derived  from  open  access
lands  often competes  in the  market  with  wood from  private  plantations.
The  price  (stumpage  fee)  the  plantation  owner  can  receive  for  his  wood  is
the production  cost  of the  "last"  tree  sold  on the  market. If the  cost
of this marginal  tree  only includes  extraction  and transport  costs,  it
will significantly  depress  market prices  and make tree growing  less
financially  viable. Even  if  tree  growing  is for  subsistence  consumption
and not income  generation,  individual  initiative  will be thwarted  when
trees  from  open  access  areas  are  available  at low  cost.
1.30  Drain  on  Government  Revenues.  The  underpricing  of  wood
resources  also results in a hidden  but real drain on scarce  public
resources. In addition  to  the  lost  opportunity  to  raise  revenues  through
stumpage fees, governments  may have to spend heavily to  subsidize
afforestation  or reforestation  in  order  to stabilize  the  soil  or relieve
local shortages  of fuelwood. Costs  for electric  power  generation  and
public  water  supply  may  also  increase  if  enough  wood  has  been  cut  to  lead
to damage  to these  other  sectors  (see  the  discussion  on externalities,
paras.  1.18  to 1.20).
Benefits  of  Charging  for  Fuelwood  Resources
1.31  Several  benefits  can be obtained  by charging  for fuelwood
resources.  Those  most  commonly  mentioned  are:
(a) To ensure  that  the  resource  is  used  with  care;
(b) To bring  in revenue  so that  government  can finance  investment
and  services,  including  the  forest  service;
(c) To encourage  investment  in  tree  planting  and  management  by all
sectors  of the  community;
(d) To ensure  that trees  will remain  a renewable  resource  rather
than  a  minable  deposit;- 12  -
(e) To encourage  (rural)  employment;  and
(f) To save  foreign  exchange.
Of course  stumpage  fees  cannot  be raised  so high  that  the  wood products
are priced  out  of the  market. However,  if  adequate  market  intelligence
is  available,  a  proper assessment  of  the commercial  value of  the
available  wood resources  can  be made.  Some  trees  or parts  of trees  may
have  a higher  value  when  sold  as poles,  sawlogs,  peeler  logs  etc.  rather
than  fuel  although the  latter is  usually the  dominant end  use.
Therefore,  market  intelligence  will give a good idea  of the amount  of
effort  that  can  be put  into  the  management  of  wood  resource.
Cost  of Charging  for  Puelwood  Resources
Costs  to  Consumers
1.32  Since  woodfuel  use is concentrated  in -- he lower  income  levels
of developing  country  societies,  it is important  to -valuate  the  effects
that  stumpage  fees  would  have  on consumers.  When  estimating  the  cost  to
consumers,  the  following  factors  have  to  be  considered:
(a) The relative  proportions  of fuelwood  supply  obtained  from  open
access,  managed  access  and  private  lands;
(b) The form in which  the  woodfuel  is consumed  (i.e.,  as firewood
or charcoal);
(c) The  distance  from  the  consumer  to  the  woodfuel  source(s);
(d) The structure  and competitiveness  of woodfuels  transport  and
marketing;  and
(e) The  elasticities  of  woodfuels  supply  and  demand.
1.33  Not  all  the  fee burden will be  passed directly to  the
consumers.  A portion  of it will be borne  by the  woodfuel  producers,
transporters,  and  dealers. A charge  for  the  raw  material  may  provide  an
incentive  to increase  efficiency,  or it  may  cut  into  profits  as  middlemen
reduce  their  mark-ups.
1.34  Studies  of charcoal  sales  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  have  shown  that
the  roadside  price  of 'harcoal  in the  areas  of production  is typically
one-third  the final retail  price  of charcoal  to urban  end users (see
Figure 1.1).  Therefore,  the percentage  effects  of stumpage  fees on
consumer  prices  are  diluted  by at least  this  3:1  ratio. However,  as is
shown  in Figure  1.1,  the  actual  stumpage  fee  in  Zambia  is  only  about  five
percent  of the selling  price. To keep  pace  with  inflation  the  stumpage
fee should  be about three times  what it is, but even a tripling  of
stumpage  will only  cause  an 8.5 percent  increase  in the selling  price,
other  things  being  equal.  A similar  increase  in the stumpage  price  of
firewood  would  increase  the  market  price  by  about  four  percent.- 13  -
FIGURE  1.1
COST  >ltENTS  CF  A  40  kg  BOM OF CHARCOAL  IN
LUSICAx  zAlIA  (OCTOBER  19U8)
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Costs  of  Fee  Collection
1.35  One comment  frequently  made is that existing  stumpage  prices
for  woodfuels  are so low  that  forest  services  cannot  cover  the  costs  of
hiring  forest  guards  and  other  field  personnel.  But  it  is  often  truer  to
say  that  revenues  are  low  because  a large  proportion  of stumpage  fees  is
never collected,  or at least  never  turned  over to the  government. In
many forest  services,  the  guards  and  other  forest  personnel  receive  such
low pay that  they  cannot  live  decently  on their  wages. Thus  there  is  a
great  temptation  for  the  collectors  to pocket  a percentage  of the fees,
or to take  handouts  from  the charcoal  producers  for not collecting  the
fees  at all. Forest  workers  may  also  start  cutting  down  trees  themselves
and  selling  products  such  as  poles  or charcoal  as a  way  to  increase  their
income.
1.36  In countries  where  stumpage  fees  are  charged,  it  has  been  found
that only a fraction  of the fees is collected  and turned  over to the
government.  In Sudan,  for example,  less than 10 percent  of existing
stumpage  fees  are  handed  over. What  percentage  is  actually  collected  is
not  known.- 14  -
1.37  Some practical  measures  need to be  taken to  improve the
collection  of fees. First,  forest  personnel  should  be  better  trained  and
better  paid.  Record  keering  should  be improved,  and  there  should  be  more
supervision  (at  least  on a  monthly  basis)  of fee  payments. There  should
be improved  recording  of the quantities  of woodfuels  entering  major
trading  centers.  More trained  field  personnel,  with adequate  means of
transport,  should  be employed  to handle  fee collection  and recording.
Experience  gained  so far suggests  that the extra  money spent  on these
measures  wuuld  pay  for  itself  many  times  over.
1.38  Another weakness in present systems is  that most  forest
services  have  no control  over  the  revenues  collected. These  have  to be
turned over to the government,  which often treats them as general
revenue.  T.e money is seldom  used to improve  the forest service.
Therefore,  the forest  service  has little  incentive  to increase  fees or
improve  the rate  of collection.  If forest  services  were required  to be
self-financing,  and  were  given  control  over  their  revenues  from  stumpage
fees,  they would  have more incentive  to collect  the  fees.  One strong
incentive  for fee collection  would be to give a small  percentage  of
collected  revenues  back  to  the  collectors  themselves,  as  a commission.
1.39  An example  from  Sudan  shows  how  much  revenue  can  be lost  when
records  are poorly  kept and stumpage  fees are not turned  over.  In
Northern Sudan in 1987 an estimated  14.4 million m  of roundwood,
equivalent  to 18.0  million  m3 of  standing  wood,  was  used  tc  make  about  60
million  (40  kg8 bags  of charcoal. If the  current  stumpage  fee  of USCll
per standing  m  (USC14  per  usable  mi)  had  been  collected  and  handed  over
to  government,  this  would  have  amounted  to  US$2.0  million. In fact,  the
total  revenue  from  all forest  products  was about  US$0.08  million.  So,
almost  96 percent  of the  revenue  the  government  should  have  received  from
its  fuelwood stumpage  fees was not  collected.  This represents  a
substantial  loss  of income  to  the  government.  It  is  not  surprising  that,
under these conditions,  governments  cannot  afford to pay for better
forest  services.
Types  of  Stumpage  Fees
1.40  Basically  there  are  two  kinds  of stumpage  fees: The  flat  rate
fee that varies  according  to end use, diameter/length  and species  but
does not consider  distance  to the market,  and the variable  fee which
takes  all or most variables  into  consideration.  Forest  services  apply
both kinds of stumpage  charges  but the flat rate is the most common
simply because most of  the areas under services jurisdiction  are
unmanaged.
1.41  Assessing  the  value  of a tree is  not easy.  Trees  may  have an
intrinsic  value  in  themselves,  but  generally  speaking  they  have  a derived
value,  derived  from  the  variety  of  products  they  can  be turned  into. The
principal  uses of wood in order  of importance  are fuel (firewood  and
charcoal), poles,  sawnwood, paper  products, panel  products  and
regenerated  cellulose  (rayon). When  we look  at the  value  of wood,  the- 15  -
order of importance  is reversed.  In terms  of the value of the raw
material  (not considering  the value  of the finishei  product,  such as
paper  or rayon),  peeler  logs  are  the  most  valuable,  followed  by sawlogs,
pulpwood,  poles,  logs for reconstituted  wood (excluding  plywood),  and
fuelwood  for firewood  and charcoal.  Logs can also be differentiated
according  to the wood species  (mahogany,  oak, eucalyptus,  etc.) and
according  to  the  diameter  or length  of  the  log,  etc.
1.42  So,  trees  will  be sold  for  different  prices  depending  on their
size,  species  and  end  use.  Also,  parts  of the  same  tree  can  be sold  for
different  prices,  and possibly  to different  markets. For example,  the
first  or butt log  might  be sold  as a peeler  log,  the second  and third
logs for sawnwood,  the fourth  log for pulp,  the top and branches  for
poles  and fuel  and the sawmill  off-cuts,  bark and sawdust  for  particle
board  and/or  fuel.  The roots  may  even  be used  for  fuel  and  the leaves
for  fodder.
1.43  Bearing  in mind what has been said,  forest  services  usually
levy a  flat rate royalty  for different  wood products  from unmanaged
natural woodlands  and forests.  Thus wood for fuel has the lowest
stumpage  charge,  followed  by poles,  sawlogs  and  peeler  logs.
1.44  The variable  stumpage  fee rate  is more likely  to be used for
wood from  managed  public  areas. This is because  wood is  generally  sold
by tender or auction,  or  factories  may offer fixed prices for the
delivered  wood.  Thus  the  distance  to the  factory  or market  can  play  an
important  role in determining  the  stumpage  price. The  market  price  for
the end products  also plays  a critical  role in determining  the price
offered  for  the  standing  wood.
Optimal  Fuelwood  Stumpage  Fee
1.45  Figure 1.2 shows the conceptual  derivation  of  an  optimal
fuelwood  fee  in  a  given  situation.  The  supply  curve  labeled  AC  -ivate  is
the  average  cost  of  wood  removal,  and  represents  the  cost  expe  ienced  by
indl.vidual  wood  resource  exploiters.  It is  assumed  that  the  cost  of the
wood raw  material  is excluded  from  these  costs. If there  is free  entry
into the production  process  then  the  equilibrium  fuelwood  price  will be
at the point  where  the marginal  cost curve  (private)  cuts the average
cost  curve  (private)  and  by inference  where  the  demand  curve  cuts these
two curves. In Figure  1.2  this  point  gives  a price  of Ppr  per  unit of
fuelwood  production  when  the  demand  is  for  Qpr  units.
1.46  The  supply curve AC  is  the average cost of  wood
production  including  the  value  of  the wood  raw  material  equivalent  to its
replacement  cost. Again  free  entry  to  production  is  assumed  so the  total
demand  will  be  Qs.  The  demand  curve  for  fuelwood  is shown  to  be kinked,
indicating  that  over  a certain  price  range  there  are  very  few  substitutes
for fuelwood. If  the  price  increased  above  this  "inelastic"  range,  then
people  would  switch  to  using  such  fuels  as crop  residues  or  kerosene.- 16  -
1.47  The difference  in price between  the two equilibrium  points
represents  the  stumpage  fee  to  be  charged  in  order  to  ensure  a continuous
supply  of this renewable  resource. The lower  supply  curve  (AC  )
may contain  some stumpage  fee element  in its  make up but thisp tee  is
insufficient  to  cover  replacement  costs.
1.48  Pigure  1.2  represents  the  cost  structure  at a specific  distance
from the market.  It also assumes  one end product  only, a  specific
discount  rate  and  by inference  one  way of raising  the  trees. These  are
very restrictive  assumptions.  It is  extremely  difficult  to derive  such
cost  curves  in  practice.  Rather  there  may  be  a series  of  cost  and  demand
curves  depending  on the  various  methods  of growing  trees  and  the  markets
for  the  products. The  markets  may  change  over  time. For  instance,  trees
planted  for pulp  wood ten  years  ago  may  be diverted  to fuels  and poles
because these products  now project a  better price.  Therefore,  in
practice,  the level  of fuelwood  stumpage  is  calculated  by the  techniques
described  in  Section  II.
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Other  Forest  Revenue  Systems
1.49  The stumpage  fee  (or  royalty)  is the  basic  charge  for  the  wood
resource.  It can be charged  for wood from either  public  or private
land. But  governments  in  general  and  forest  services  in  particular  often
impost  other  fees  and/or  taxes  on  wood.  These  can  be in  addition  to the
stumpage  fee,  or in  place  of it. An FAO  booklet,  "Forest  Revenue  Systems
in Developing  Countries:  Tjeir Role in Income  Generation  and Forest
Management  Strategies"  (Grav,  1983),  gives  a list  (p.  79)  of the  types  of
forest charges and  alternative  forest revenue arrangements.  For
woodfuels,  in  addition  to the  stumpage  fee,  charge.  can  be  made  for:
(a)  Forest  products  (value  added  tax);
(b) Productive  factors  (equipment/labor);  and
(c) Services.
Charges  on Forest  Products
1.50  Charges on forest products  are the most common method of
raising  revenue. In the  case  of  wood  products,  they  are  often  used  as a
substitute  for stumpage  fees,  because  they  are easier  to calculate  and
collect.  Strictly  speaking,  a charge  levied  on a product  is a value
added  tax,  not  a fee.
1.51  There  are drawbacks  to taxing  the  product  instead  of charging
for  the  raw  material. In the  case  of  charges  for  charcoal,  for  example,
factors such as  efficiency  of  conversion  and  the  raw  material's
suitability  for  use  as charcoal  may  be ignored.  Valuable  species  and/or
sawlog-sized  material  may be used to make the  charcoal. Also,  two or
three times more wood than necessary  may be used in the conversion
process. Great  savings  can  be realized  if the  raw  materal-  is  properly
prepared  and  the  charcoaling  methods  used  are  efficient.
1.52  If private  wood  growers  are  taxed  on their  wood  products,  they
have no  incentive  to grow wood for profit, because government is
capturing  the  value  of their  raw  material. One way  around  this  problem
is to return  a tax  credit  to the  growers  to compensate  them  for  the  raw
material  they  produce.
1.53  Product  taxes  can  be charged  in  addition  to stumpage  fees.  In
that  case,  all  the tax  money  can  go to the  taxing  authority,  either  the
local  or the  central  government  (or  both). This  money  can  be treated  as
general  revenue  and  be  used  to finance  government  services  including  the
forest  service. However,  from  a business  viewpoint,  the  stumpage  fee  or
proxies  for it should  be credited  to the forest  service  or grower,  to
enable  the wood producers  to cover  their  own costs,  including  a profit
margin.- 18 -
1.54  Collecting  Fees  Along  Main  Trade  Routes. When  forest  products
are traded, they are usually transported  along major trade routes.
Agents for central  and local governments  regularly  collect  fees from
vehicles  carrying  forest  products  along  these  routes. However,  because
the  government  collectors  are  poorly paid, and  little control is
exercised,  a large  portion  of the  fees  is never  turned  in.  In order  to
improve  the  remittance  rate,  a system  of bonuses  or commissions  could  be
introduced,  together  with  a good  monitoring  and  reporting  service  on key
transport  routes  to tabulate  the  trade  in  forest  products.
1.55  A second  example  from  Northern  Sudan  illustrates  the size  of
government  losses. In the  northern  area,  an estimated  60 million  40 kg
bags of charcoal  are  consumed  annually. About  25 million  of these  bags
go to urban  areas.  In 1987  the  central  government  tax  on charcoal  came
to SL 0.15 per bag. 7/  If just  the tax from  urban  charcoal  had been
collected,  the  revenue from this source would have  been SL  3.75
million. But,  in  the  period  1982-1985,  the  total  revenue  from  all  forest
products  averaged  SL 0.34  million  per  year.  When  the figures  for 1987
become  available,  they  are  expected  to  be similar. It is  worth  pointing
out  in this  case  that  if all tax  on  charcoal  in  Sudan  was  collected  and
turned  over to government,  it could finance  the 1988 forestry  budget
about  four  times  over.
Charge  on  Productive  Factors
1.56  Governments  sometimes  use charges  on pxoductive  factors  as a
means  of raising  revenue,  either  in  addition  to or in place  of stumpage
fees.  These  charges  have mainly  been  applied  to sawmills. Either  the
rated  capacity  of the  mill is  taxed  or  a tax  is  imposed  according  to the
size of  the workforce.  A  similar concept could be  applied for
industrial-scale  charcoal  production. For example,  a  charge  could be
levied  based  on  the  capacity  of  the  charcoal  kilis. But  such  a system  is
a poor  substitute  for  stumpage  fees  because  the  rated  capacity  of a kiln
does not give an accurate  indication  of actual  output.  It is also
impossible  to  apply  such  a  charge  to  firewood,  making  it  vcry  selective.
Charges  for  Services
1.57  Forestry  services  may collect  additional  charges  besides  the
stumpage  fee to compensate  for the  work they  do in supervising  cutting
operations.  For  example,  a fee  may  be charged  to pay  forestry  personnel
for  estimating  the  volume  of  wood  to be  cut,  or to pay  for  the  time  they
must take to measure  the trees  and control  operations  when an area is
being  harvested.  This  is  sometimes  called  an  entry  fee. Entry  fees  are
7/  This tax consisted  of the  original  1932  fee  of SL 0.063  per  40 kg
sack  plus  an additional  SL 0.087  to account  for inflation(l).  In
addition,  there  is a local  district  tax  of SL 0.10  per sack.  The
exchange  rate  in November  1987  was  SL  4.5  =  $1e00  (parallel  market:
SL  6.0  =  $1.00).- 19  -
usually  flat rate charges  for services. Though  they  may appear  to be
similar  to stumpage  fees if they  are  directly  related  to wood volumes,
they  are  rarely,  if  ever,  used  in  place  of stumpage  fees.
1.58  In  addition  to  the  entry  fee,  a  removal  permit  may  be issued  by
the  forester  (for  a set  fee)  when the  logs  or products  are  removed. At
the  same  time,  the  forester  may  collect  a  tax  on the  wood  product.
1.59  Although  taxes  on  productive  factors  and  services  may  be  easier
to collect  than stumpage  fees,  and are a legitimate  means  of raising
revenue,  they  should  not be used  in place  of stumpage  fees. Applying  a
product  tax  instead  of a stumpage  fee  for  the  actual  wood  raw  material  is
a second-best  solution.- 20  -
II.  METHODS  FOR  ESTIMATING  STUMPACE  VALUES
2.1  Market distortions  due to taxes  and subsidies,  shortage  of
accurate,  time-tested  data,  and confusion  of terminology  complicate  the
task  of estimating  stumpage  values. These  problems  have  to  be taken  into
account  when  using  the  methodologies  described  in  this  section.
2.2  The  main  methods  used  to  estimate  fuelwood  stumpage  values  are:
(a) Market  Approaches:
(i)  Residual  stumpage;
(ii) Auctiun  sale/tender;
(b)  Surrogate  market  approaches:
(i)  Opportunity  cost  of  gatherer's  time;
(ii) Differential  land  values;
(c)  Cost-based  approaches:
(i)  Alternative  fuel  substitution;
(ii) Wood  replacement  cost.
2.3  Stumpage  values  can be estimated  using either  financial  or
economic  criteria.  The basic  methodology  is the same for both.  For
simplicity,  this  section  focuses  on financial  analysis,  using  examples  of
actual  costs  and  prices. Key  price  adjustments  fot  economic  analysis  are
noted  in the  text. In application,  the  level  of  dic',mposition  for  shadow
pricing  purposes  will depend  on the level  of acciracy  desired.  Cood
examples  may be found  in Cittinger  (1982)  and ot'er  standard  texts  on
project  economic  analysis.
Market  Approaches
Residual  Stumpage
2.4  One way to determine  the stumpage  fee for the  various  forest
products  is  to work  back  from  their  market  price  through  the  wholesaler,
transporter,  producer,  extractor,  and tree cutter  (or  feller),  allowing
for local  taxes  and fees,  rent,  and profit  margins. This will give a
"residual  stumpage  fee"  which  sets  a limit  on  what  can  be charged  for  the
standing tree, taking into consideration  how much of  the tree is
saleable. This analysis  has been performed  in Table 2.1  for charcoal
production  in Sudan  at a specific  distance  (400  km)  from  the  market. The
table groups  the costs  under  various  headings  and each line item may
summarize  many individual  operations. For example,  charcoal  production
costs include  but are  not limited  to--tree  cutting,  preparation  of the
raw  material,  kiln  building,  firing,  cooling,  charcoal  bagging,  loading,
etc.- 21  -
Table  2.1:  1986 COST  COWPONENTS  OF RETAIL  CHARODAL  PRICES  IN KHARTOUM,  SUDAN
FOR  CHARCOAL  PRODUCED  IN THE BLUE  NILE PROVINCE
--------- Unit  US S-----------
Line  Item  Cost  Cumulative  Total
Cost  Items  (Including  Profit)  Per  Sack a/  Per Sack  Per  Tonne
Marketing  Cost  In  Khartoum  0.79  3.50  100.00
Transport  and  distribution  costs  (400 km  one  way)  C,70  2,71  77.50
Charcoal  depot  costs  Including  transport  to
depot  (50 km bush  roads)  0.30  2.01  57.50
Charcoal  production  costs  (including  felling)  0.87  1.71  49.00
Residual  price  for  charcoal  wood  0.84  0.84  24.00
Residual  Stumpage  Price
Cost  per  tonne  of  wood used for  production  b/  4.80
Cost  of  wood per  m3 used  for  production  b/  4.00
Cost  per  m3 standing  (residual  stumpage fae)  cl  3.20
8i/  Average  weight  of  sock  In  Khartoum market  assumed  to  be  35 kg,  80% (28 kg)  of  which  Is  lump
charcoal.
b/  On average  five  tonnes  of  air  dry  wood (15% m.c.d.b.)  required  to  produce  one tonne  of  fully
carbonized  charcoal  sold  In  the  market  place.  Actual  production,  accounting  for  losses,
would  be 1.2  tonne  per  fIve  tonne  of  air  dry  wood.  Also  1.2  m3 a  1 tonne  air dry  wood;
therefore  six  cubic  metors  are  used per  tonne  of  charcoal  sold.
cl  Assu-se that  20%  of each  selected  tree  Is  not  suitable  for  charcoal  productlon.  Also  because
not  all  species,  and  not  all  sizes  of  trees  are  desirable  for  charcoal  production  the  actual
stumpage  price  for  the  average  tree  Irrespective  of  species  or  size  may be  between 52.1  and
53.2  per  m3  standing.
Source:  Sudan Forestry  Sector  Review:  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  Region  1986.
2.5  The charcoal  production  process  has  been studied  in detail  in
Sudan. There,  charcoalers  range  from  casual  producers,  who  generally  use
inefficient  techliques,  to  large-scale,  efficient  producers  who  run  well-
organized  'bush  camps'  for  four  to six  months  at a time. In the  camps,
most of the  charcoal  is first  produced  in small  kilns,  using  unseasoned
wood,  in a quick-production  process. As the  season  progresses,  the  wood
raw  material is  dried properly,  larger kilns are  built, and  the
production  cycle  takes  longer. All  these  steps  increase  the  efficiency
of production.  Because  efficiency  improves  as the season  progresses,- 22  -
data should  be collected  and production  costs  averaged  over a complete
season. The collection  of data  and  estimate  of costs  may  involve  large
numbers  of people,  using  a variety  of  estimation  techniques.  Total  costs
of the  operation,  not  just  direct  costs,  need  to  be collected.
2.6  When calculating  stumpage  values  by this method,  we have to
determine  the wastage  at each phase of the production  and marketing
cycle.  For example,  only certain  tree species  and specific  minimum
diameters  may be used  for charcoal  production. Therefore  only  a small
percentage  of the total  number  of trees  in a parcel  of woodland  may be
used, and  only a  portion  of  the volume of  those trees that are
selected. While  the  tops  and  thin  branch  wood  are  usually  discarded,  the
volume  of wood used is usually  greater  than volume  of the stem wood
alone.  If wood is measured  by weight,  the  moisture  content  should  be
known, so that the weight can be specified  at a  standard  moisture
content.
2.7  When  using the  residual  stumpage  method,  the  volume  or weight
sold  to the consumer  has to be related  to the  standing  volume  of wood,
not the production  ex-factory  or ex-depot. Therefore,  we have to find
out  how  much  charcoal is  lost  through powdering,  handling and
transportation  etc.  from  the  time  it leaves  the  site  until  it is  finally
sold at the market.  If this is not done, the calculated  residual
stumpage  value  may  be too  high.
2.8  Two factors  likely  to affect  the  residual  stumpage  value  are:
(a) the market  price may be controlled,  either  by direct  government
intervention  through  subsidies  on  woodfuels  or through  subsidies  or price
controls  on substitute  products;  (b) the government  may have already
charged  a stumpage  fee  and/or  a product  tax. Working  backwards  from  the
selling  price,  one  may  end  up at or close  to the  mandated  price  or tax,
especially  when  charcoal  is  being  brought  over  long  distances.
2.9  Transport  costs  must be factored  in. 8/  As these  vary with
distance  to the  market,  the  residual  stumpage  price  should  go  down  as one
moves  away  from the  market. While  at the  margins  the  residual  stumpage
price  approaches  zero,  near  to  the  market  it  may  be  high  enough  to induce
people  to grow trees  commercially  for  use as fuelwood. As an example,
the location  of the Ethiopian  capital  was stabilized  when  entrepreneurs
established  a ring  of  woodlots  close  to  this  population  center.
2.10  A drawback  of the  residual  stumpage  method  is that it implies
that  trees  are  going  to  be used  for  one  purpose  only.  In  practice,  wood
has  a multitude  of uses.  A good  entrepreneur  will  know  the  markets  for
fuelwood,  charcoal,  poles,  handicraft  products,  roughly  hewn  timber  and
sawlogs  and know  what mix  to aim  for  in order  to maximize  profits. If
proper  market  intelligence  is applied  the actual  stumpage  price  for a
parcel  of trees  may vary  considerably  from  the single  end use residual
8/  For  detailed  discussion  of  transportation  costs,  see  Annex  2.- 23  -
stumpage  price. Therefore,  by  managing  the  tree  resources,  knowing  what
species  and size  classes  are present  and knowing  the  potential  markets
for tree  products,  a much increased  revenue  could  be obtained  that  might
more  than  cover  the  additional  management  costs.
2.11  Economic  Analysis. To arrive  at an economic  stumpage  value,
standard  shadow  pricing  methods  can  be applied  to the  build-up  of price
from  woodland  to  market. Foreign  exchange  components  in  the  production,
transport  and  marketing  of the  woodfuel  need to be adjusted  to reflect
over-  or  undervaluation of  foreign  currency  (UNIDO  method);
alternatively,  if working  in border  prices  a standard  conversion  factor
should  be  applied  to  domestic  components  (Little-Mirrlees  (1974);  Squire-
Van der Tak  (1975)). Actual  or imputed  wage rates  should  be shadow
valued  to  reflect  the  scarcity  value  of skilled  and  unskilled  labor.
2.12  The  resulting  estimates  of  economic  stumpage  value  will  account
for  certain  distortions  in  the  domestic  economy  but  will  be fundamentally
based  on market-ascribed  values  of  fuelwood  and  woodfuel  products. While
a  well-known  procedure,  residual  stumpage  valuation  essentially  begs  the
question  of whether  fuelwood  should  be  valued  differently  by society  than
by the private  market. This  question  was  explored  in detail  in Section
I.  It is especially  relevant  if most  of the  fuelwood  is  harvested  from
unmanaged  or uncontrolled  access  public  woodlands. In  this  case,  market
woodfuel  transactions  may  reflect  a low  or zero  fuelwood  stumpage  value,
since the wood was obtained  by the producers  at low or zero private
cost.  The apparent  value  of fuelwood  at the  forest  gate  often  reflects
only  the  cost  of felling,  cutting  and  haulage,  with  no allowance  for  the
value  of  the  wood  resource  itself.
Auction  Sale/Tender
2.13  The residual  stumpage  method  is complicated,  and the  residual
arrived  at may  already  be influenced  by  taxes  or subsidies.  If  the  trees
were sold standing,  or if the owners  marketed  the cut  wood themselves,
the stumpage  fee could be arrived  at directly.  Also it is usually
assumed for economic  analysis  that the resource  owner's sale price
relects  the  "sum  of  sacrifices"  (opportunity  costs)  made  in  producing  the
trees.  Thus the auction/tender  sales price should  reflect  economic
stumpage  values  more accurately. But the  auction/tender  method  should
really  only  be used  when the  seller  (government  or private  owner)  knows
what  wood resources  are being  grown,  and  has some  idea  of the  potential
market  for the  wood products. Government  forest  services  often  do not
realize  the  potential  value  of the  wood  growing  in  government  forests  and
woodlands,  and  will  undervalue  the  wood  to  be sold. Many  buyers  also  do
not  know  the potential  value of  the wood, and may  consider some
marketable  trees or parts of trees as waste (the tops and branches
sawmillers  leave behind  are an example).  The owner of the resource
should  either  charge  for  this  "waste"  or  market  it separately.  FAO- 24  -
experts  pointed  out  several  years  ago  9/  that  if  whole-tree  marketing  had
been  practiced in  the  conifer plantations  of  Western Kenya, the
government  could have  increased  its revenues from the  plantations
considerably.  10/
2.14  While selling  trees standing  gives a direct  figure  for the
stumpage  price,  this figure  may also be influenced  by fixed  prices  and
subsidies. This  is  especially  so  for  charcoal,  where  either  the  selling
price  is fixed  by government  or subsidies  are given  by not charging  a
realistic  price  for  the  wood  raw  material,  or a combination  of  the  two.
Surrogate  Market  Approaches
2.15  Market-based  methods  presuppose  that fuelwood  is an actively
bought  and  sold  commodity.  Often  in  rural  areas  fuelwood  is  gathered  for
personal  consumption  or acquired  through  traditional  systems  of exchange
that  are  hard  to measure  or  understand.  Even  when  fuelwood  is  marketed,
the  price  obtained  may  not  reflect  its  true  value. Lacking  clear  market
signals  for  fuelwood,  the  analyst  looks  for  a substitute  or  complementrry
good  or service  from  which  fuelwood  values  can  be inferred.  Two  examples
of surrogate  market  methods  are  discussed  in  the  following  paragraphs.
Opportunity  Cost  of  Wood  Gatherer's  Time
2.16  The amount of time villagers  spend on fuelwood  collection
activities  is one indication  of the social  cost or value  of fuelwood
supply.  Time spent  per household  on fuelwood  gathering  activities  may
range  from  one-half  hour  per  day  in  wood-rich  environments  to  5  hours/day
in the desert areas of the Sahel.  The economic  cost of fuelwood
gathering  is seen  as the  alternative  ways  in  which  household  labor  could
have been employed.,  e.g. subsistence  production,  cash cropping,  food
preparation,  etc.  By analyzing  the labor  inputs  and the value  of the
output  for these  alternative  activities,  the marginal  productivity  of
labor can be estimated.  The prevailaing  minimum  wage rate for an
unskilled  agricultural  worker  can  be used  as a rough  substitute  for  this
estimate  to obtain  the economic  value of the wood gatherer's  time.
Dividing  this  figure  by the  amount  of wood  gathered  per  unit  of time,  we
arrive  at an  approximate  value  for  a  unit  of  fuelwood.
2.17  In  practice, the  labor opportunity  cost method is data-
intensive  and  time-consuming.  Since  little  is  known  about  how people  in
rural  areas spend  their time,  a field-based  time-and-motion  study  may
have to be made.  Another  problem  is that rural  minimum  wages  may be
9/  Wilson,  J. L., 1982:  Integrated  2awlog/Pulpwood  Harvesting  Trials:
Western  Kenya.  Technical  Co-operation  Programme  TCP/KEN/OOO1,  FAO,
Rome.
10/  An example  of the  types  of losses  that  can  be sustained  when trees
are  sold  by  auction  is  given  in  Annex  1.- 25  -
fixed  by decree  or government  example. Thus  they  may  not reflect  labor
opportunity  costs in areas of high under-employement  or unemployment.
World  Bank  or United  Nations  reports  can be consulted  to obtain  data  on
shadow  wage  rates  for  rural  labor  in  some  countries.
2.18  A more serious  criticism  of the  labor  opportunity  cost  method
is the  same  one  leveled  against  the  residual  stumpage  approach.  That  is,
there is no compelling  evidence  that the time devoted  by rural  wood
producers  internalizes  the  value  of  a standing  tree. What  we usually  see
are surrogate  market  transactions  for the  cutting,  splitting  and local
haulage  of firewood,  much  as these  same  costs  may  be  directly  observed  as
cash  transactions  in  market  methods. A labor  ,pportunity  cost  value  for
fuelwood  should  thus be considered  a lower  bound figure  for fuelwood
stumpage.
2.19  The  above  problems  can be  illustrated  with a  fictitious
example.  A  village  study  was undertaken  in two periods,  five years
apart,  namely  in  July  1983  and  July  1988. The  results  in  Table  2.2  were
obtained  from  observation  of  the  village  fuelwood  collectors.
Table  2.2: RESULYS  OF  A  VILLAGE  FUELWOOD  COLLECTION  SURVEY
Year  Year
1983  1988
Species  c-llected  Acacia  sp  Acacia  sp
Average  weight  of  a  headload  (kg)  22.3  21.9
Moisture  content  (dry  basis)  %  12  16
Headload  weight  without  water  (0%  mc)  (kg)  19.9  18.9
Energy  value  of  headload  (MJ)  366  347
Solid  volume  (liters)  26.8  26.3
Percentage  stemwood  on the trees  56  62
Percentage branchwood  on the  trees  44  38
Percentage  of  wood  not  collected
(small  twigs,  chips  etc.)  8  5
Distance  to  the  collecting  area  (km)  3.9  6.3
Time  walking  to  collection  ground  (min)  52  84
Time  walking  back  from  collecting  ground  66  105
Total  walking  time  (mins)  118  iSV
Time  to  collect  and  prepare  headload  (min)  26  33
Hourly  rate  unskilled  labor  July  88  terms
rural  area  (USS)  0.18  0.18
Shadow  price  of  labor  in  July  88  terms  (S)  0.12  0.12- 26  -
2.20  Table  2.3 shows  the  stumpage  values  estimated  using  the  data  in
Table  2.2.
Table  2.3: STUMPAGE  VALUE  BASED  ON  OPPORTUNITY  COST  OF  WOOD  GATHERERS'  TIME
1983  1988
UsS  USS
Value  of  solid  fuel  volume  per  m3  a/  b/  a/  b/
i)  Total  walking  and  collection  time  c/  (144  min)  16  11  (222  min)  25  17
11) Walking  to  and  from  site  only  (118  min)  13  9  (189  min)  22  14
lii) Difference  in  total  time  1988-1983  (16) (11)  (  78  min) 9  6
Stumpage  value  per  m 3 of  total  standing  volume  d/
I) Total  walking  and  collection  time  15  10  24  16
ii)  Walking  to  and from  site  only  12  8  21  13
111) Difference  in  total  time  (15) (10)  9  6
Stumpage  value  per  m 3 based  on  stemwood  only  e/
i)  Total  walking  and  collection  time  27  18  39  26
11) Walking  to  and from  site  only  21  14  34  21
lil) Difference  In  total  time  (27) (18)  15  10
8/  Hourly  unskilled  labor  rate  (1988  value)
b/  Shadow  labor  rate  (1988  value)
c/  Worked  example S0.18  x 144  min  x 1000  I  =  S16
60  min  26.8  1
d/  Worked  example  $16 x (100  - 8)% = $15 (8%  of  wood  on  the  tree  not  used)
100%
e/  worked  example  515 aS27  (56%  of  the  tree  wood  is  stem  volume)
56%
2.21  A crude  opportunity  cost  measure  of stumpage  could  be related
to the total  walking  and collection  time  and to the mass or volume  of
wood collected. However,  the  collection  time  is equivalent  to felling,
cross cutting and extraction  and therefore  should  be excluded.  The
stumpage  value based  on walking  to and from  the site is probably  more
pertinent.  But this value is equivalent  to transport  costs,  not the
standing  value  of the  tree. If  the  trees  had  been  on the  doorstep  of the
collectors  then  their  walking  time  would  have  been  minimal  but  the  trees
would  still  have  value. This is  why  the  last  measure--the  difference  in
total  collection  time--is  perhaps  the  best  "opportunity  cost"  measure  of
stumpage  value.  This measure  represents  a marginal  analysis  for it
depicts the increase  in cost, over time, of fuelwood  collection. A- 27  -
bracket  figure  has been  put  down for  1983  for  it  can  be deduced  that  at
some time in the past  dead  branchwood  would  be lying  outside  the  door.
Thus  the  walking  and  collecting  time  was  practically  zero. Therefore  the
difference  between  then  and  1983  would  be  approximately  equal  to i)--the
total walking  and collectior  time--and  for 1988 the cumulative  total
would  be the  sum  of all  the  previous  marginal  increases  which  in  fact  is
the  figure  in  line  i).  But  of course  we are  assuming  that  when  the  dead
branchwood  was  lying outside the door it had no value.  Resource
economists  could  counter  this  by  saying  that  as soon  as  a product  is  used
it has value.  But  what  figure  is to  be put  on  a product  that  has  grown
without  human  intervention?  This  could  be  ascertained  by another  survey
on  peoples'  willingness  to  payl
2.22  Table  2.3  also  gives  three  stumpage  value  figures  depending  on
whether the value is equated  to the total standing  volume,  the stem
volume or the volume of wood actually  consumed.  This is a  first
approximation  and cannot  be applied  to products  that  are converted  from
one  form  to  another,  such  as fuelvood  to  charcoal.  Whether  to  relate  the
value  to the  stem  wood  or to  the  total  above-ground  volume  depends  on  how
practical  it is  to  measure  total  volume. It  should  be  noted  however  that
because  these  particular  trees  contain  useable  branch  wood the  stumpage
value  based  on stemwood  measure  is over 50%  higher  than  the solid  fuel
volume  value.
2.23  Table  2.2  shows  that  the  "energy"  quality  of  wood  collected  in
1983  was higher  than  that  collected  in  1988  because  it  was  drier  and  thus
had more useful  energy  per  unit of measure. In our  particular  example
the 1983  wood  had  an energy  value  of 16.4  MJ/kg  and  the  1988  wood  a  value
of 15.8  MJ/kg,  or about  a 4 percent  difference.  This  difference  should
be taken  into  consideration  when  working  out  a stumpage  value,  especially
if it is based on weight.  Freshly  felled  wood can contain  over 50
percent  water where  as dry wood contains  only about 15 percent.  In
volume terms there is only about 5 to 10 percent  shrinkage  between
"green"  wood  and  dry  wood  but,  when  burnt,  green  wood  yields  less  energy
per  unit  of  dry  matter  because  energy  is  required  to  drive  off  the  water.
2.24  Finally  like many other  methods  that try to fix a stumpage
value  for  wood this  method  assumes,  incorrectly,  that  there  is only  end
use  for  the  product.
Differential  Land  Values
2.25  Sometimes,  the value  of a natural  amenity,  such  as a forest,
bacomes  a factor  in the  price  of marketable  assets. An analysis  of the
price  differentials  of such  assets  may  help  determine  the  implicit  value
of the  natural  amenity. The  differential  land  value  approach  is  based  on
this  principle  and is applied  to the  valuation  of timber  resources,  but
is less  commonly  seen  in fuelwood  contexts. To use  the  method  one  needs
to know the sales  prices  or exchange  values  of comparable  parcels  of
land, some stocked  with fuelwood  resources  and the other practically
empty  of trees. If  the  lands  are  otherwise  similar  in  terms  of location,- 28  -
access, terrain,  soil fertility,  etc. observed  diferences  in acreage
values  must be due to the presence  or absence  of fuelwood. Estimating
the yield  of fuelwood  harvest  leads  to a unit  value  of wood,  or so the
theory  states.
2.26  Though this procedure  for deriving  the  stumpage  value of
fuelwood  in woodlands  or open  forest  is theoretically  sound,  it suffers
from limitations  of availability  and  accuracy  of data.  Traditional  land
values may  be expressed  in non-monetary  terms,  which require rough
translation  to cash  equivalents,  or the land  tenure  system  may be such
that  actual  land alienation  and  exchange never occur.  Even  if
observable,  land  prices  are  based  on numerous  factors,  not  all of which
will  be comparable  as the  method  suggests. Also the  additional  amenity
value  only  remains  as  long  as  the  forest  is  left  standing.  This  value  is
lost  as soon  as the  forest  is  clearfelled.  To keep  the  amenity  value  one
would  need  a system  of management  that  does  selective  felling  in patches
rather  than  clearfelling.
Cost-based  Approaches
2.27  The methodologies  we have  descrived  so far  look  at the  problem
of  estimating  fuelwood  values from the benefit side, by examining
consumers'  actual  or apparent  willingness  to pay for the cooking  and
heating  that fuelwood  provides. Other  approaches,  equally  productive,
look at the cost side,  at the inputs  needed  to obtain  the supply  of
fuelwood  or substitutes  of cooking  or  heating.
Alternative  Fuel  Substitution
2.28  To try to overcome  the problems  of price  fixing  or subsidies
affecting  the fuelwood  trade,  we can look at the cost of substitute
products  to see if fuelwood  products  are competitively  priced.  Our
discussion  will focus  on kerosene  as this is usually  the most widely
consumed  alternative  fuel  to fuelwood  and  charcoal. ll/
2.29  For economic  analysis  there are adjustments  required  when
using  this  method  similar  to those  earlier  described,  such  as taking  into
account  subsidies  and fixed  prices  which  may  not fully  reflect  kerosene
transport and  distribution  costs to rural areas.  Also,  in most
developing  countries  kerosene  is imported  or refined from imported
crude.  Thus the currency  exchange  rate  affects  the price  of imported
products. Many  developing  countries  have  an over-valued  currency  which
lowers  the  price  of imported  products  in  terms  of  local  currency.  This
Il/ In wood-depleted  areas,  agricultural  residues  commonly  substitute
for  fuelwood. In this  case,  the  value  of fuelwood  may  be inferred
by estimating  any loss  of agricultural  productivity  resulting  from
the  removal  of the  residues.  See  paragraph  1.19.- 29  -
difficulty  can  be overcome  by applying  a  shadow  exchange  rate, if
available,  or some  other  suitable  rate  such  as the  parallel  market  rate.
2.30  Table  2.4  shows  how  a price  for  charcoal  is  obtained  based  on
alternative  fuel substitution.  A first  analysis  of the table  indicates
that  the  market  price  of charcoal  in  Nairobi  (Kenya)  is  greater  than  the
market price of  kerosene,  especially  if households  are  using the
traditional  charcoal  stove  to cook  with.  Either  the price  of charcoal
should  drop (which  would  also  mean  lowering  the  residual  stumpage  price
for wood, with existing  conversion  technologies)  or people will be
motivated  to switch  to the cheaper  alternative  fuel.  Even  applying  a
shadow  exchange  rate some 20 percent  greater  than the actual  exchange
rate still  has  kerosene  as  the  cheaper  alternative  fuel  to  charcoal  using
traditional  stoves. Charcoal  only  has an advantage  over kerosene  if a
family  is  using  an improved  stove.
2.31  However,  while  the Kenyan  government  follows  a policy  of not
taxing  kerosene  (or  taxing  it to a very  small  extent)  they  restrict  its
import  for balance  of payment  reasons. This leads  to the  rent-seeking
behavior  of buying  kerosene  at the  official  price  and  reselling  it at up
to double  the price,  because  demand  exceeds  supply  at the lower  price.
Taking this into consideration,  the price of charcoal is probably
competitive  with  kerosene  if  the  charcoal  is  bought  by  the  bag. But  some
charcoal  is sold  by the  pile  or the  tin  at  up to double  the  price  of  the
bag.  So the  picture  is complicated  and the  comparative  analysis  is not
straightforward.  If Kenya  were to import  the kerosene  needed  to meet
desired demand  then at least 20 percent  more fuel would have to be
imported,  both in  volume  and  value  terms. This  change  might  affect  the
balance  of payments  and  reduce  rural  employment  (fewer  charcoalers,  etc.)
2.32  Table  2.4 shows  that  with the  present  oil  prices,  kerosene  is
perhaps  the cheapest  purchased  fuel  in Nairobi. In other  time  periods
and in other countries  different  conclusions  may be drawn.  Also the
stove  efficiency  assumptions  may be critical  to the calculations. If
these  assumptions  are on the  high side  for  kerosene  and  on the  low  side
for charcoal,  then the substitute  price in the above  example  could  be
higher  than  the  actual  selling  price. So the  use  of accurate  values  in
such  a table  is  important.
2.33  The  method  of alternative  fuel  cost  for  determining  a stumpage
price  for  wood  raw  material  can  be a useful  tool. However,  it  has  to  be
combined  with  the  residual  stumpage  price  method  to arrive  at a stumpage
fee  and  of course  it  assumes  a single  end  use  for  the  raw  material.
2.34  Effects of  Consumer  Taste.  We have assumed so far that
charcoal  (or  even  firewood)  and  kerosene  are  near-perfect  substitutes  for
each other.  But analysis  of the household  sector in Jamaica,  for
example,  shows  that  this  is  not  necessarily  true. In  Kingston,  where  the
analysis  was made,  consumers  appear  to prefer  charcoal  to kerosene  for
reasons  other  than cost of delivered  energy. Charcoal  users  pay a 70
percent  premium  to  burn  charcoal  as compared  to  kerosene.- 30 -
Table  2.4:  1988  KEROSENE  SUBSTITUTE  PRICE  FOR  CHARCOAL:  NAIROBI,  KENYA
(a) Kerosene  Price  per  Liter  at  the  Retail  Outlet
Kshs/l  USS/I
Actual  selling  price  of  kerosene  (tax  free)  at  retail  outlet  3.47  0.18
Adjust  selling  price  with  exchange  rate  of  KShs  22  per  USS  I/  3.96  0.18
(b) Stove  Efficiency  Assumptions  and  Energy  Values  of  Fuels
Kerosene  energy  value  35  MJ  per liter
Kerosene  wick  stove  40%  efficient,  therefore
1 liter  of kerosene  will  deliver  14  MJ/I  to  the  pot
Charcoal  energy  value  30  MJ  per  kg
Traditional  charcoal  metal  stove  15%  efficient
therefore  1  kg  ch.  delivers  4.5  NJ/kg  to  the pot
Ceramic  lined  charcoal  stove  25%  efficient,  therefore
I  kg  ch.  delivers  7.5  MJ/kg  to  the  pot
(c) Calculated  Kerosene  Substitute  Price  for  Charcoal  Assuming  End  Use Is  for  Cooking
Sostitute  Price  Per  kg  Substitute  Price  Per  30  kg  Sock
Actual Shadow  a/  Actual  Shadow
USS  Ksh  Ksh  USS  Ksh  Ksh
Traditional  Stove  0.06  1.10  1.32  1.74  31.76  38.19
Ceramic  lined  Stove  0.10  1.83  2.20  2.89  52.94  63.64
Cd) Actual  Selling  Price  including  fees  and  taxes  (Ksh)
Per  kg  Per  30  kg  bag  b/  c/
wet  season  2.33  70.00
dry  season  2.00  60.00
(govt.  controlled  price)  (1.50)  (45.00)
(e) Calculated  Example
(traditional  stove)  18  c/I x  4.5  MJ/kg  *  5.8  conts/kg  or
14  MJIi  0.06  S/kg
a/  A shadow  exchange  rote  of  Ksh 22  - IUSS  has  been  used.  Actual  exchange  rate is  about  KSh
18.3  *  1US$  (Sept.  88).  Black  market  rate  Is  KSh 22-25  *  1USS.
b/  It  Is  assumed that  the  30  kgs  of  charcoal  Is  fully  carbonized  and  all Is  burnable. In  practice
1-2% may  be  charred  wood with  an  energy  value  of  about  22  NJ/kg  and  10% may be  powder  and
fines. The  powder  and  fines  are  more  difficult  to burn  than  lump  charcoal. If  the fines  are
not  burnt  then  the  energy  value  per  kg  of "sold"  charcoal  In  torms  of  actual  charcoal  burnt  Is
about  27NJ/kg.
c/  The Government  controlled  price  for  a 30 kg sock  Is  Ksh 45 (price  control  act (CAP  504)  1982
amended  1983).
2.35  The preference  for charcoal  can be explained  as follows:
Charcoal  is  an  attractive  fuel  for  those  with  low  incomes  because  it  can
be  bought  in  small  quantities  on  a  daily  basis,  can  be  burned  in  a  tire
rim that  has virtually  no capital  cost,  and  can  be obtained  almost- 31  -
anywhere.  Kerosene,  on the other hand, must be bought in minimum
quantities  of a  quart  (1.14  liters),  must  be  burned  in  a stove  that  costs
the local currency  equivalent  of US$30,  and is not available  at all
times. Also,  many  consumers  complain  that  food  cooked  on kerosene  stoves
smells  and tastes  of kerosene. For these  reasons,  kerosene  cannot  be
seen  as  a perfect  substitute  for  charcoal.  11/
Wood  Replacement  Cost
2.36  In densely  populated  rural  and  urban  areas  of many countries,
the  wood  raw  material is  being  depleted due  to  indiscriminate
harvesting.  Depletion  of wood  resources  can  take  place  over  a number  of
years if the wood supply  in the beginning  is large in relation  to
demand. But,  if  nothing  is  done  to correct  the  situation,  supplies  will
eventually  dwindle.  By the time the critical  point of scarcity  is
reached,  it is too  late  to start  planting  trees  to meet  current  demande
As the average  maturity  period  is ten to twelve  years,  people  may be
forced  to switch  to other fuels  such  as crop  residues,  animal  dung or
oil-based  fuels.
2.37  Stumpage  values  can  be calculated  on the  basis  of the  cost  of
replacing  the lost wood resources.  Planners  calculate  the cost of
reforestation  programs  and arrive  at an estimated  stumpage  price  high
enough to  cover costs and give a  specified  return on  investment.
Governments  may then  try  to  raise  the  existing  stumpage  fees  gradually  to
cover  the  full  cost  of  growing  the  trees.
2.38  Table  2.5 from  the  1986  World  Bank  Second  Wood  Energy  Project
Staff  Appraisal  Report  for  Malawi,  12/  shows  how a stumpage  estimate  is
derived  from  the  cost  of  growing  plantation  trees  for  fuelwood. In this
table, existing government  costs are projected  over a  thirty year
period. In the  example,  it was  proposed  to plant  3,000  hectares  over  a
six-year  period  at an average  rate  of  500  ha/year. After  the  first  crop
had been felled,  the trees  would  be allowed  to grow from suckers  for
another  three  rotations,  so that  each crop  cycle  would  be 24 years.  A
discount  rate  of 12 percent  was used  to discount  both  the  costs  and the
volume. Discounted  costs  were  then  divided  by  discounted  yield  to  arrive
11/ Sociological  and traditional  values  also enter  into  household  fuel
choice.  These factors  may also affect  the substitutability  of
fuels.
12/ In several  World  Bank  reports  and  assessments,  it has been stated
that stumpage  fees should  be fixed so as to cover the long run
marginal  cost of growing  the wood.  This is a sound  statement  in
theory  but in  practice  it  is  almost  impossible  to  undertake  marginal
cost analysis. To undertake  rigorous  marginal  analysis,  all cost
and growth  functions  for tree  production  must be known.  A better
solution  is to  use  average  incremental  costs  (AIC),  as in  the  Malawi
example.  AIC  should not  be  confused with  average costing
procedures.- 32  -
at a stumpage  price  of 15.3  Kwacha  per solid  m3. As a result  of this
calculation  the Government  accepted  the Bank's  recommend4tion  that the
stumpage  price  for  fuelwood  would  be increased  to  3.9  MK/m3  in  March  1986
and  #fter  that  at 15 percent  annually  in real  terms  until  a fee  of 15.3
MK/m'  is  achieved  by  the  target  date  of 1996.
Table  2.5:  MALAWI  SECOND  WOOD  ENERGY  PROJECT:
STUWAGE  CALCULATION  FOR  GOVERNMENT  PLANTATION
(3,000 ha at  LIlongwe) b/
Year  Costs  Benefits









9-12  52.5  per  year  40  per  year
13  52,525
14  52.542
15-18  52.5  per  year  46  per  year
19  52.522
20  52.536
21-24  52.5  per  year  40  per  year
25  52.518
26  52.530
27-30  52.5  per  year  33  per  year
PDV  of  costs  (at  12%)  *  2194.1  Discounted  Yield  (at  12%)  *  143.3
Solid  m3  Stacked  m3
Stumpage  Fee to Cover Replacement  Cost * 2194.1  a  15.3  mk  c or  10.7  mk
143.3
January 1986  Stumpage  Charge  *  2.9  mk  or  2.0  mk  c/
a/  Base  costs  as  of January  1986,  Including  physical  contingencies.  Area
planted  over  6 year  period  with  a  rotation  of  6  year.  Year  1,  303  ha;  Year
2,  494  ha;  Years  3-6,  551  ha  per  year.
b/  The Lilongwe  plantation  has  been  used  to calculate  the  stumpage  rates,
because the  average above ground merchantable mean annual  Incre.wnt  (MAI)
over  4 rotations  of 12  m3 solid/ha  Is  considered  typical. The  assumed
average  MAI  per  rotation  Is  In  m3/ha  12.1;  13.9;  12.1  and  10.0  respectively.
c/  January  1986  exchange  rate  USSI  a  1.80  Malawlan  Kwacha  (WC).- 33  -
2.39  While  the  replacement  cost  method  used  in  Table  2.5  is  a  useful
tool, there are several  problems  with the way the calculations  were
made. These  are  discussed  in  the  next  paragraphs.  13/
2.40  First,  in the  table  only  the  option  of supplying  fuelwood  from
a government-managed  plantation  is considered  in  estimating  the  stumpage
value.  But in most developing  countries,  government-grown  plantation
fuelwood  supplies  only  a small  fraction  (probably  less  than  5 percent)  of
the total demand.  Other sources  of supply  and other  variable  costs
should  have  been  considered in  estimating the  stumpage value.
Alternatively,  if there  were no other  suitable  sources  of supply,  the
costs of  damage to the environment  from not replacing  the fuelwood
(externalities)  should  have  been  factored  in.
2.41  Second,  in this table  a flat rate fee is used,  ignoring  the
effect  of distance  from  the  market. Stumpage  fees  should  be  on  a sliding
scale to take into account all the variable  costs, especially  the
transport  costs.
2.42  Third,  there  are  cheaper  ways  of raising  trees. In the  Malawi
report,  the cost  of raising  trees  in  government  plantations  was  compared
with the cost of growing  trees in small farmer  woodlots.  It was
estimated  that  the  costs  of the  government  planting  would  be three  times
greater  than  for  the  woodlots  (the  respective  discounted  values  for  a 1
ha area  at 12  percent  discount  rate  were  894  Kwacha  and  258  Kwacha). If
the  woodlot  option  had  been  chosen  as the  way  to  determine  stum3age  fees,
the  derived  stumpage  value  might  have  been  about  6 Kwacha  per  m  (instead
of 15.3 Kwacha)  provided  the yields  of wood from the two  options  were
about  the  same.
2.43  Fourth,  the  discount  rate  chosen  can  have  a significant  effect
on the derived  stumpage  value.  In Table 2.5, a discount  rate of 12
percent  was used. Later,  after  reconsideration,  this  rate  was  changed  to
8 percent. If  8 percent  had  been  used  in  the  table,  the  derived  stum3age
fee  to cover  replacement  cost  would  have  been  10.7  Kwacha  per  solid  m  or
nearly  5 Kwacha  less  per  m  (30%)  than  the  estimated  value  using  the  12
percent  discount  rate.
2.44  Finally,  if a stumpage  value  is based  only  on the  replacement
cost  of wood in  government  plantations,  this  implies  that  the  government
has  a monopoly,  that  it  can  dictate  the  price  of  wood  resources,  and  that
there  are  no freely  available  substitutes  on  the  market. Even  if  this  is
true,  it  will  only  be  true  in  the  short  run. Eventually,  other  producers
will enter the market and will produce  substitute  goods.  However,
13/  Current  World  Bank  work  in  Malawi  has  recognized  the  above  drawbacks
and  has  modified  specific  targets  for  stumpage  fees  to  a  general  one
of reaching  replacement  costs  by 1996  using  a  number  of options  for
growing  treee. Also  the  monitoring  and  revenue  collection  system  is
being  improved  to  ensure  that  more  money  is  collected  by  Government.- 34  -
government  stumpage  fees may set a "leading  price"  for private  wood
producers  and consumers,  and  thus  influence  the  stumpage  prices  obtained
by private  producers.
2.45  The above  criticisms  of Table  2.5  do not make  the  replacement
cost method  less  valid,  but point  out some  of the  factors  that  we must
take  into  account  when  using  the  method. We must  consider  all the  ways
of growing  and managing  trees,  factor  in dirtance  from the  market  and
other variables,  and critically  examine  costs  and yield to see where
costs can  be  reduced and  yields increased.  Also  the  cost and
availability  of substitute  goods should  be built into forecasts  to
estimate  their  market  share  and to see  how  much  reliance  must  be placed
on  wood  raw  material  to  meet  future  energy  demands.- 35  -
XII. FUELVOOD  STUKPAGE  FEB  SYSTEMS  IN  PRACICE
3.1  In  the preceding  sections,  we have presented  the economic
justification  for charging  fees for fuelwood  stumpage  and described
various  methods  usod  for  estimating  stumpage  values. This  section  looks
at the  practical  application  of stumpage  fees.
3.2  Today, not all countries  charge a  stumpage  for  fuelwuod,
Botswana  being a  case in point.  Also,  most LDCs do not charge  for
fuelwood  if it is for self cousumption  because  it is difficult  if not
impossible  to collect  from  a large  number  of  self  consumers.  However,  as
soon as wood products  become  commercialized,  the levying  of fees is
possible  especially  if  production  is  concentrated.
3.3  The bulk  of wood raw  material,  especially  fuelwood,  originates
from  government  land.  Therefore,  examples  of stumpage  fee systems  will
be given  from  state  forest  services.  In some  LDCs  private  individuals  or
institutions  grow  wood  for  sale. The  individual  will  try  to  maximize  the
income  from  the  sale  of wood  and  would  take  into  consideration  end  use  or
uses  an.d  distance  from  the  market. This  is  only  partially  done  by forest
services  as the examples  from four African  countries--Zambia,  Malawi,
Rwanda  and  Niger--will  illustrate.
3.4  Table 3.1 shows the Zambian  government's  revised  fees for
forest  products,  published  in March,  1988.  In principle  the fees  are  a
flat  rate  but  they  vary  according  to  end  use,  species,  or product  size.
3.5  The  table illustrates  a  number of  problems  mentioned in
Section  I:
(a) Flat  rate  fees  on products  ignore  the  variable  of  distance  from
the  markets. Transport  costs  can  greatly  influence  the  selling
price  of a wood product,  especially  firewood  and charcoal;  a
charcoal  producer  near the  market  can  sell  a sack  of charcoal
for  a much  higher  price  than  one  remote  from  the  market. Thus
the  grower  of the  wood  raw  material  should  be  able  to  command  a
higher  price  if  he  is situated  close  to the  market;
(b)  In Zambia, wood for fuel is sold not standing  but either
stacked  or as a fee  on the  finished  charcoal  product. Though
it is easier  and less  time-consuming  to charge  for the semi-
finished  or finished  product  than  to charge  for the  wood raw
material (the standing  tree), this is only a  second-best
solution. Charging  for  the product  lessens  the incentive  of
the buyer  to make full,  efficient  use of the material. For
instance,  if a charcoal  producer  pays  only  for  the  wood  removed
in the  form  of  charcoal  (and  perhaps  some  poles),  he  has  little
incentive  to use  all sizes  of wood,  a greater  mix  of species,
to process  the  wood  efficently,  and  to try  to  market  all  of  his
charcoal,  including  the  powder  and  fines. One  way  around  this- 36  -
problem  is to auction  the trees or sell them  by tender  and
specify  that  all  wood is  to be  removed,  the  site  is  to be left
in a  clean condition,  etc.  If there are many potential
purchasers,  and  no collusion  between  the  buyers,  the  price  bid
should  reflect  the  true  market  price,  taking  into  consideration
the  quality  and  quantity  of the  wood  and  other  products  and  the
distance  from the markets.  In practice,  it is not often
feasible  to use this  approach  for fuelwood. While  levying  a
charge  on the  product  is  a second-best  solution,  at least  some
of  the  raw  material  value  will  be  captured;
(c) When the same  wood  product  is sold  in  different  units,  or the
unit is not clearly  specified--in  this example,  fuelwood  is
charged  by the  stacked  cubic  meter,  the  cord  or  the  head  load--
the  price  charged  for  the  same  product  can  vary  widely. In  the
Zambian  case, the charges  for the stacked  wood, cord, and
headload  are  ZK 4.8,  ZK 4.2  and  ZK 15.2  respectively  per  solid
ms.  Because  of this difference,  the poorest  sector  of the
community,  who  usually  buy  by the  head  loa.i  and  carry  away  the
wood  themselves,  are  being  asked  to pay  more than  three  times
the  amount paid by  the  charcoal producert and  fuelwood
merchants  who  purchase  in  bulk. If the  charcoal  producer  pays
for  the  wood  via  the  sack of charcoal  rather  than  the  stack  of
wood he is even  paying  less.  An efficient  pro  ucer will  pay
the equivalent  of about ZK 1.6 per solid m  whereas t3he
inefficient  producer  will  pay  as  little  as  ZK 1.0  per  solid  m ;
(d)  If the unit of measure  on which the fee is levied is not
precise  then  significant  differences  of interpretation  between
the  buyer  and  seller  can  and  do occur. In  Table  3.1  the  solid
cubic  meter  is  the  only  precise  measure;  all  the  other  measures
are variable.  A well-piled  stacked  cubic  meter  may contain
0  65 m  solid  whereas  a poorly  stacked  one  may  only  have  0.33
m  solid,  or half  as  much  as the  well  stacked  wood.  Obviously
the buyer will favour  the  measure  based on the  well stacked
pile  but  the  seller  should  favour  the  loosely  stacked  pile. In
West Africa  the stere  or stacked  cubic  meter is the common
measure  and  this  leads  to  many  anomalies.  Likewise  the  bag  of
charcoal  is an inprecise  measure. In Zambia  there  are three
sizes  of bags  containing  approximately  25 kg,  30 kg and 40 kg
of charcoal. If  the  fee  is  levied  by the  bag  then  the  producer
will be foolish  to use small  bags.  This is the case  in the
Sudan  where the producer  packs the charcoal  in large sacks
containing  up to 100 kg of charcoal. Once the fee  has been
paid the charcoal  is transported  to a  depot where it is
repacked  into  smaller  sacks. In  order  to reduce  the  degree  of
interpretation  the  selling unit should be  as  precise as
possible,  such  as the solid  cubic  meter  or the  weight  of wood
at  a given  moisture  content.- 37  -
(e) Forest  services  need  to  revise  their  fees  and  taxes  often.  The
Zambian  fees  quoted  in Table  3.1  were  published  about  eight
years  after  they  were  first  proposed,  and  therefore  were  out  of
date as soon  as they  came into  effect. In Sudan,  stumpage
rates  and other  forest  fees  have  not  been  revised  since  the
1930s.  As forest  service  fees  generally  have  to  be  approved  by
the government  in developing  countries,  the issue  of fee
revision  can  become  politically  sensitive,  and  the  process  is
usually  slow.  But  in  most  cases,  if realistic  stumpage  fees
were  set  and  the  charges  properly  collected,  the  money  obtained
would more than pay for an improved  forest  service,  and
investments  in  wood  production.
Table  3.1: ZAMBIA  1988  - FEES  AND  PRICES  FOR  FOREST  PRODUCTS
(Revised  March  25,  1988)
Part  I
Per  tree  Per  Cubic  Meter
------Units/Kwacha  a/------
A  Timber
001  Afzelia  quanzensis  35.00  80.00
002  Alvizia  species  25.00  60.00
003  Balklaea  pluriJuga  37.00  90.00
011  Pterocarpus  angolensis  40.00  100.00
012  Other  species  12.00  20.00
B  Poles  b/  Kwacha
021  PG  es  not  exceeding  14  cm  butt  diameters  0.20  each
022  Poles  between  15  and  19  cm  butt  diameters  0.50  each
025  Bamboo  1.50  per  20  canes
C  Fuel  from  Indigenous  Trees  Kwacha
0.31  Stacked  In  cubic  meter  or  Just  stacked  3.00  per  m3  stacked
0.32  In  cords  1  m xl  m x  3  m  8.00  per  stacked  cord
0.33  In  headloads  2.50  per  5  headloads
0.34  Charcoal  c/  0.50  per  standard  bag
D  Hut  Materiel  various  products  and  prices
E  Miscellaneous  various  products  and  prices
Part  11
Fees  and  Services  various  services  and  fees
Part ilI
Honey  and  Beeswax  various  grades  and  charges
a/  Official  exchange  rate  (May  88)  K7.86  *  USSI  (Feb.  89)  K10.00  *  USSI.
Parallel  market r.te  (May 88) K30-K40  *  USSi  (Feb.  89)  K80-100  a USSi.
b/  Length of  poles  nt specified
c/  The standard bag may vary  between 35 kg and 40 kg.  Also there  Is  a removal fee  of
KOo50  per  bag.
Source:  Zambia  Gazette  dated  March  25,  1988.- 38  -
3.6  Some forest  services  use log size  to differentiate  their  raw
material,  for  instance  the size  of sawlogs. Table  3.2  shows  an example
of this  practice  used  in  Malawi. Differentiating  by size  recognizes  the
.act  that  the  larger  the  diameter  of  a log,  the  greater  the  percentage  of
sawnwood  or charcoal  that  can  be recovered  from  it,  and  the  greater  the
unit  price  that  can  be obtained  by selling  it for  poles,  etc.  However,
like  the  fees  in  Zambia$  no account  is  taken  of  distance  from  the  market.
Table  3.2:  MALAWI  FOREST  DEPARTMENT  SALE
PRICE  OF  STEM  WOOD  EX  ROADSIDE  a/  b/
(Kwacha  per  m3  sold)
Details  Mk/m 3 cI
Under  2.5  m long  and  under  20  cm  butt  diameters  2.9
Greater  than  2.5  m  and  up  to  3.0  m In  length
Butt  diameter  range  cms.
20.0  - 23.9  7.9
24.0  - 27.9  10,2
28.0  - 31.9  12.5
32.0 - 35.9  14.9
36.0  - 39.9  17.2
40,0  - 43.9  19.5
44.0  - 47.9  21.9
48.0  - 51.9  24.2
52.0 - 55.9  26.6
56.0 - 59.9  28.9
60.0  - 63.9  31.2
64.0 - 67.9  33.5
68.0  and  above  34.4
Greater  than  3.0  m and  up  to  5.0  m In  length
Butt  diameter  range  cms
20.0  - 23.9  14.2
24.0  - 27.9  18.4
28.0  - 31.9  22.6
32.0  - 35.9  26.8
36.0  - 39.9  31.0
40.0  and  above  34.4
Greater  than  5.0  a and  above  In  length
Butt  diameter  range  coms.
20.0  - 23.9  15.7
24.0  - 27.9  20,4
28.0  - 31.9  27.6
32.0 and above  34.4
a/  These  fees  date  from  1985.  A  rovlslon  was  due  In  June  1988.
b/  No  specles  are  gIvon.
c/  Current  exchange  rate  USSI  u  2.641 M. Kwacha.
Source:  Malawi  Forestry  Department.- 39  -
3.7  Table  3.3 shows  a proposed  stumpage  fee system  developed  for
Rwanda  in which  varying  fees  are  charged  according  to distance  from  the
processor  to  the  final  market.
Table  3.3:  RWANDA  - PROPOSED  FEE  FOR  CHARCOAL  WOOD  TO  SUPPLY  KIGALI  a/
(Units  FRw  b/)
A.ea  Distance  from  Charge  per  Equivalent  Stumpage  Fee
Kigali  Store  c/  d/  per  m3  standing  e/
Kms  FRw  FRw  (USS)
Around Klgall  0-25  1000  1540  (20)
Kibungo,  Gitarama,  Byumba  25-75  800  1230  (16)
Gisony.  Ruh6ngerl,  Kibuye
Butare,  Kivumu  75-150  600  925  (12)
Regions  In  Northeast,
Southwest,  East  150  plus  400  615  (8)
2/  At  present  there  Is  a  fixed  price  of  FRw  400  per  (standing)  store  or  FRw  500/stere
at  the  roadside.  However,  In  practice  charcoal  producers  often  pay  less  In  some
areas,  sometimes  as  low  as  FRw  200/stere  (standing).
b/  Current  exchange  rate  (June  1988)  USSI  = 77.37
c/  Store  - Stacked  cubic  meter  which  should  contain  between  0.60  m3  and  0.65  .3  solid
vol  ume.
d/  This  Is  the  price  before  the  trees  are  felled  and  stacked.  For  the  equivalent
roadside  price  (that  Is  after  felling,  cross-cutting  and  stacking)  add  another  FRw
100.
e/  Assuming  an  average  stacking  percentage  of  65.
Source:  Robert  van  der  Plas,  World  Bank  Office  Memorandum  of  March  1,  1988.
3.8  If this proposed  fee system  is adopted  for  Rwanda,  the rates
shown  in the  table  may have  to be adjusted  because  of resistance  by the
charcoal  producers.  Also, the additional  fee charged  for saving  on
haulage  works out at between  FRw 26 (US  33 cents)  and PRw 36 (US  47
cents)  per tonne-km,  which  is very  high.  A difference  of PRw  50 to FRw
80 per  stere  (12  to 13  cents  per  t/km)  between  each  of the  four  areas  may
be  more  realistic.
3.9  A  plan to rationalize  fuelwood  supply,  proposed  for Niger,
illmstrates  the application  of a "second  best"'  but workable  firewood
fee.  Fuelwood  is the  major  source  of energy  in  Niger  and is  used  by 98
percent  of the  households.  Although  complete  data  are  not  available,  it
is widely accepted  that the rate Qf consumption  of fuelwood  greatly
exceeds the  rate of  natural regeneration  in  many environmentally
vulnerable  areas.  Especially,  the concentrated  and  intense over-
expoitation  of the  natural  forest  cover  around  the  urban  areas  has  led  to- 40  -
increased  degredation  in those  zones.  The  urban  population  is largely
unaware of this problem  as the market  supplies  the consumer  with a
steady,  uninterrupted  supply  at the  prices  chown  in  Table  3.4.  Despite
substantial  nominal  increases  in prices  of firewood,  prices  in constant
terms  have  not  risen,  and  in  fact  have  even  decreased.
Table  3.4:  FIREW0OO  PRICE  BUILD-UP:
NIAMEY,  NIGER  1986  a/
FCFA/kg  S
Purchase  price  at  source  2.4  15
(already  cat)
Firewood  fees  0.2  1
Transport  costs  4.8  31
Wholesale  margin  ?  2  14
Wholesale  price  9.6  61
Distribution  costs  1.0  6
Retail  margin  4.9  32
Retail  price  15.5  99
o/  Costs (May 1986)  are based  on  firewood
transported  by  trucks  and  sold  In  the  Niamey
area.  Exchange  rate  of  FCFA  329  =  USSI.00.
3.10  The replacement  costs  of  firewood  through  reforestation  schemes
are  estimated  to  be:
Terraced  irrigation  tree  plantations  - CPAP  170/kg
Rain-fed  tree  plantations  - CFAF  85-130/kg
Rural  private  tree  plantations  - CFA?  30-60/kg
Such investments  and costs  are not sustainable  and would represent  a
heavy  burden  if they  had to be passed  on to consumers. An alternative
approach starts from  the  premise that, with  proper cutting and
management,  firewood  yields  of the  forested  area  around  Niamey  could  be
doubled  and sustained  over  the  long-term.  This  has been  tested  under  a
forestry  project (Guesselbodi)  financed  by USAID,  where it has been
demonstrated  that managing  and protecting  the forest cover  against
overuse  can  lead  to an increase  in firewood  supply  at a cost  of between
CRAP 16 and 30/kg.  So, a conservative  calculation  indicates  that  the
economic  cost of firewood  supply  to Niamey  is at least  FCPA 32/kg,  or
twice  the  market  price.
3.11  At present,  there  is  no incentive  for  local  villagers  to invest
in managing  or protecting  the forest  cover  because  they cannot  legally
keep  others  from  exploiting  their  investment,  given  the  ambiguous  nature
of wood stock  property  rights. Existing  legislation  allows  for  partial- 41  -
or total  handing  over  of  responsibility  and  authority  for  the  management
of the  forest  cover  to the  local  community. If this  were  done,  it  would
make the tas'.  of regenerating  forest  cover  around  urban  areas easier,
provided  financial incentives were  used  to  encourage community
initiatives.
3.12  The Covernment  of Niger has decided,  under a  proposed  IDA
forestry  project  (Credit  1226-NR),  to promote  and support  management  of
the wood stock  by local  people. A combined  wood stock  management  and
firewood  supply  system  will  be  created  through  the  following  steps:
(a) Zoning of  areas around urban centers according to  their
firewood  production  potential.
(b) Development  of a  system  for controlling  and monitoring  the
trade  in firewood  and  assessing  fees. Urban  check  points  would
be created  and  rural  firewood  markets  would  be sited  in areas
of  high  firewood  production  potential.
(c)  Creation  of incentives  for local  people  to manage  firewood
resources  rationally  by vesting them with property  rights
contingent  on adequate  management,  guaranteeing  them stable
urban  market  demand  for  fuelwood  produced,  and  earmarking  taxes
levied  on  the  trade  to  finance  resource  management  costs.
3.13  Fiscal details have  not  yet  been  finalized,  but  the
approximate  firewood  fee  levels  are  to  be  as follows:
Table  3.5:  PROPOSED  NIAMEY  REGION  FIREWOOD  FEE
Component  FCFA/kg
Development  fee  5
Resource management  fee  2
Distance-related  fee  variable:  0-2
Administration  fee  1
Total:  8-10
Source:  Niger  Household Energy  Conservation  and
Substitulon,  Report  0082/88,  UNDP/World  Bank,
January  1988.
The proposed  levies  are  to be  phased  in  gradually,  and  adjusted  annually
thereafter  following  an  established  formula.  The  first three fee
elements  are  an attempt  to  capture  at least  part  of the  economic  stumpage
value. The  last  element  is  designed  to  cover  the  costs  of  administration
and  fee  collection.- 42 -
3.14  The  Niger firewood  fee assessment  scheme, in its present
formulation,  does  not  discriminate  between  plantation  grown  and  naturally
regenerated  fuelwood. As such,  it could  potentially  have a depressing
effect  on incentives  to  establish  private  fuelwood  plantations.  However,
under  the  dry  Nigerien  conditions,  it is  safely  assumed  that  the  bulk  of
future  firewood  supply  will  be  derived  through  managed  regeneration.  The
remaining  disadvantages  are  probably  outweighed  by the  high  costs  of the
alternative--doing  nothing.- 43  -
IV.  CONCLIUSIONS
4.1  In  most  developing  countries  the  internal trade in  wood
products,  especially  fuelwood  and charcoal,  is very large.  In Africa
alone the annual  value  of traded  fuelwood  and charcoal  is probably  in
excess of US$2,000  million  while the annual  total "value" of these
products  (including  self collected  fuelwood)  may be in the region  of
$6,000  million  to $8,000  million. This  trade  in wood  energy  supports  a
large  number  of  people  in  processing,  distribution  and  marketing,  yet  the
value  of the  wood,  the  raw  material  on  which  the  whole  Lrade  depends,  is
in most cases insufficient  to ensure  that it will remain  a renewable
resource. The  actual  stumpage  fees  collected  by  African  governments  for
fuelwood  and  charcoalwood  could  be in  the  region  of $30  million  per  annum
or about  2Z  of the  selling  price  of the  finished  products. If trees  are
treated  as a minable  resource  not only will it adversely  affect the
economies of  these  countries but  will  surely cause  long  term
environmental  damage.
4.2  In most countries  the rationale  for fixing  stumpage  fees is
little  understood, and  the  collection of  existing fees  poorly
undertaken.  Very  few  people  expect  oil  to be  free,  but  most  assume  that
woodfuel  is free. This  may  be  because  most  trees  grow  without  help,  but
oil has to be won from  the  ground  in a few  restricted  locations  and  its
processing  easily  controlled.  In  addition,  most  governments  are  unaware
of the size of the trade  in wood products  and few  realize  that if an
adequate stumpage  fee was charged they could not only finance the
investments  required  in the forest sector, but by taxing the wood
products  have  some  revenue  for  general  development  as  well.
4.3  This  paper  has  looked  at the  ways  of  assessing  the  value  of the
wood raw material. Valuation  should  at least  be based  on the cost of
substitute  goods  provided  the  wood product  has competitive  substitutes.
This is one way to determine  stumpage  value,  the comparative  cost of
alternatives.  However,  in general  the  long  run  replacement  cost is the
most  satisfactory  method to  use, but  it must be  remembered  that
production  techniques  vary  enormously  and  all tree  growing  methods  must
be examined,  not just the relatively  expensive  plantation  techniques.
Distance  from  the  market  or processing  factory  is  an important  component
and must be included  in the  calculations.  And  because  trees  have  many
functions  and wood raw  material  has several  end uses,  which  may change
over time,  a knowledge  of the  potential  market  is vital;  thus  the  value
of the  trees  may  be location  and  time-specific.  Hence,  other  approaches
are described  to detrmine  stumpage  values,  namely, the sale of the
standing  crop, the residual  stumpage  value and the surrogate  market
approaches.
4.4  Because of  market distortions-subsidies,  taxes, imperfect
competition,  etc.--arriving  at a value  for the raw materi&l  grown in
scattered  locations  is  not  easy. Because  the  production  process  usually
takes  much  more  than  a  year,  a rate  of  discount  has  to  be included  in  the- 44 -
calculations  and the assumed discount  rate may have a  significant
influence  on the replacement  cost  value.  Nevertheless,  until  adequate
stumpage  fees  are levied  and collected  by the  tree  owners,  very little
investment  will occur in the forestry  sector  and this could lead to
serious  economic  and  environmental  problems.- 45  -
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Annex  1
THE  EED  FOR  MARKETING  INTELLIGENCE  VHEN  AUCTIONING
TREES-M  EUMALE FROM  KENYA
The example  is from a seven year old eucalyptus  plantation
grown  within  the  city  boundaries  of Nairobi,  Kenya.  This is  the second
crop,  but  the  first  crop  grown  from  suckers  of E.  grandis. There  are  20
hectares  to fell and the management  unit of the forest service  has
e2timated  the  volume  of  stem  wood  to  be  175  m3/ha  and  branchwood  to be  2
m /ha giving  a topal  estimated  volume  for the 20 hectares  of 4000 m
stemwood  and  500  m  branchwood  - (2860  tonnes  at 15Z  moisture  content  dry
basis).
The present  way  of selling  the  stand  is for  a licensed  timber
contractor  to come  into  the  plantation,  cut  down  the  trees,  crosscut  the
logs into  one  meter  lengths,  and pile  the  logs  into  stacks  of one  cubic
meter  (1 stere). The  forest  service  will  then  check  the  measurements  of
the  stacks,  count  them  and  charge  the  contractor  at  a fixed  s$umpage  rate
of Ksh 16 per stere  (US$0.90)  or about  Ksh 25 per solid  m  (US$1.40).
The  small  branch  wood  and  tree  tops  are  usually  not  included  in the  pile
so  about  5,800  steres  are  counted  (3770  m ),  which  produces  a revenue  of
Ksh  9i,800  (US$5,155).  This  gives  an  average  stumpage  price  of Ksh  26.5
per  m  of stemwood  or Ksh 23.2  per  m  of stemwood  plus  branchwood.  The
cost in 1988  terms,  of growing  and  maintaining  this  particular  crop in
the five  crop  cycle  of E. grandis  came  to Ksh  48,500  (US$2,965),  giving
an internal  rate  of  return  of  8.6%.  1/
If a proper  inventory  lad been  undertaken  it would  have been
discovered  that in the 3500  of  stemwood  there were 200 m3 of
transmission  poles and 1400  of building  poles,  w3hose  respective
stumpage  fees  are  Ksh 130  per  m  ($7.20)  and  Ksh  70  per  m  ($3.90).  Thus
the  income  would  have  been  as follows:
200  m3 transmission  poles  Ksh  26,000
1400  m3 building  poles  Ksh  98,000
2170  m3 fuelwood  (3340  Steres)  Ksh  53,440
3770m3 Ksh  177,440 ($9,858)
The  cost  of  the  inventory  is  estimated  at  Ksh  5,000. Thus  the  additional
net  income  from  proper  inventory  work  comes  to  Ksh  179,640  (US$4,424)  and
the  internal rate  of return  is  increased  to  15.1%. The  stumpage  value
1/  Costs  and  revenues  discounted  back  by  up to  14  years  for  this  second
year  rotation.- 47  -
is increased  to Ksh  51.3  per  m3 of stemwood  or Ksh  44.9  per  m3 of total
wood.  2/
However,  if besides  undertaking  an inventory,  the  market  price
of the various  products  had been ascertained  then the information  in
Table  1  could  have  been  obtained.
The  cost  of  gathering  market  information  is  estimated  to be  Ksh
3,000 thus the additional  net income  compared  to the present  way of
selling  the  wood in Kenya  could  amount  to some  Ksh 691,080--over  seven
times  the original  income. The internal  rate of return  would  be about
26Z  and  the  stumpage  value  for  stem  wood,  Ksh  226  per  m3 ($12.50),  or for
total  wood  Ksh  198/m 3 ($11.00)
Table  1: MARKET  PRICE,  ESTIMATED  STUMPAGE  PRICE  AND
ESTIMATED  MARKET  SHARE  FOR  20  ha  E.  grandis--NAIROBI,  KENYA
Estimated  Market  Estimated Total  Value
Quantity  Price  Stumpage  On the
(including  Price  Stump
profit)
Product  *3  Ksh/m 3 Ksh/m 3 Ksh
1. Small  branchwood  and  Twigs
sold  ex-forest  by  the  headload  230  150  90  20,700
2. Household  fuel  sold  at  the  market  440  214  99  43,560
3.  Industrial  fuelvood  delivered  to
a  soap  factory  for  boiler  fuel  1,730  164  94  162,620
4. Building  poles  sold  at  the  market  1,400  500  335  469,000
5. Transmission  poles  delivered  to
factory  200  600  480  96,000
Total/Average  4,000  308  198  791,880
Stem  wood  only  3,500  226
If a proper  inventory  had been undertaken  and information  on
market  prices  obtained,  a standing  sqle  by auction  should  have brought
bids  in  the  range  of Ksh  220-226  per  m  of stem  wood.
2/  If the  additional  management  cost  is  deducted  from  the  gross  revenue
then the stumpage  price  would be  reduced  to Ksh 49.9 per m  of
stemwood  or  Ksh  44.9  per  m  of  total  wood.- 48  -
Annex  2
EFCT  OF TRANSPORT  AND  LOCATIONAL  RNTS-AN  EXAMPLE  FROM  SUDAN
As  soon as  forest products  become  commercially  important
mechanized  means of transport  are used.  Generally  within  a country
fuelwood,  charcoal,  poles  and sawlogs  are  carried  by trucks,  but  donkey
carts may be used and, occasionally,  railroad  cars, barges  or river
boats. Usually  wood  raw  material  has  a relatively  low  value  in relation
to its  weight. This is why,  in most  cases,  processing  takes  place  near
the raw material  source. It is  also the  reason  why  products  with very
little value added such as  fuelwood  cai only be transported  over
relatively  short distances  before they price themselves  out of  the
market.  1/  Thus,  there  are  definite  maximum  distances  for  various  forest
products  beyond  which  it becomes  uneconomic  to trade  these  goods.  Of
course  this can vary from country  to country  and over time.  It also
depends  on the size of the transport  container  and whether  it travels
empty  in  one  direction or  is  moving goods  in  both  directions.
Nevertheless,  there  is  a fairly  good  linear  relationship  between  distance
travelled  and  the  cost  of  transport.  Therefore,  the  closer  wood  is  grown
to the market the higher  the price it should  command,  reflecting  the
saving  in transport  costs.  When translated  into stumpage  terms,  this
transport  variable  gives  rise to a "locational  rent'  component  of the
stumpage  fee  or  value.
Thus,  unless  wood is uniformly  dispersed  throughout  a country
in relation  to demand,  the stumpage  price  should  not be a flat rate.
This means that the  closer  the raw  material  is to the  market  the more
intensive  the  production  methods  could  be.  Therefore  at the  margins  of
economic  exploitation  very little  effort  can be put in to managing  the
wood resource,  and the principal  supply source  is generally  shrubs,
scattered  trees,  unmanaged  woodlands  or natural  forests. Near to the
market, plantation  grown trees may  be economically  viable, with a
gradation  of  options  in  between.
In December  1987,  the World Bank published  a study  entitled
Vehicle Operating  Costs (Chesher  and Harrison 1987) which examined
evid'ence  of transport  costs  from  Kenya,  the  Caribbean,  Brazil  and  India
for the period 1972 to 1982.  The report  looked  at such factors  as
vehicle speed, fuel and  lubricant  costs, tire costs, maintenince,
depreciation,  interest  payments  and  crew  costs. The road  surface,  rise
and  fall,  and its  curvature  were  also  taken  into  consideration  and  costs
1/  In the  subsistence  sector  the  maximum  distance  that  can  be  travelled
is usually  1/2  day's  walk  one way  although  in some  countries,  for
example,  Morocco,  the  women  may stay  out  overnight  when  collecting
the winter's  fuel supply.  Here they generally  take a donkey  to
bring  the  load  back.- 49 -
were  worked  out  depending  on these  variations.  For  8 to 10 tonne  trucks
(gross  weight  between  12 and  14  tonnes)  the  cost  per  tonne  per  kilometer
(/t-km)  ranged  from  US 1.8  to 4.3  cents  in India;  2.0  to 4.0 in Brazil
and 4.1 to 6.8 in the  Eastern  Caribbean. At the  lower  cost  end  of the
range  were  smooth  surfaced  roads,  with  10  m rise  and  fall  per  km and  1000
of curvatures  per  km,  while  at the  higher  cost  end  were  rough  roads  with
50  m rise  and  fall  per  km  and  500°  of curvature  per  km.  Similarly  for  a
35 t vehicle  in  Brazil  (gross  weight  of  40  tonnes)  the  corresponding  cost
range was from US 1.1 to 2.3 cents /t-km.  It is assumed  that the
vehicles  in question  were fully  laden and thus the unladen  cost per
tonne-km  should  be less  by about  20Z. A similar  study  was  undertaken  in
the  Sudan  in  the  early  1980s  by  the  National  Energy  Administration.  They
found that on surfaced  roads  the  average  cost per tonne-km  (including
operator's  profit)  for  a light  truck  (6-8  tonne)  was  US 6 cents,  and  for
a heavy  truck  (25  tonne)  US 5 cents. The  railways  and  river  corporation
quoted  a cost  of  US  4 cents  per  tonne-km,  but  it  was  indicated  they  could
be profitable  with  a  rate  as  low  as  US 2  cents  per  tonne-km.
Using  the above  figures  for  Sudan  and subtracting  the cost  of
felling  and extracting  fuelwood  from  the  wholesale  price  of fuelwood  in
Khartoum,  curves  can  be  drawn  of the  maximum  price  that  could  be paid  for
fuelwood  and charoal  wood at varying  distances  from the market  with
different  modes  of transport.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figures  1  and  2.
Comparing  Figures  1 and 2 it will be seen  that close  to the
market  a higher  stumpage  price  could  be  obtained  if the  wood  was sold  as
firewood  directly  rather  than sold for charcoal  production. However,
when  goods  are  carried  in  both  directions  the  cross  over  point  comes  at  a
distance  of about  125  km from  the  market  and  then  a  higher  price  could  be
obtained  for charcoal  wood.  In practice  in Sudan  households  generally
prefer  charcoal,  whereas  bakeries  require  firewood. Thus, there  is a
much larger demand for charcoal  and much of the wood that supplies
charcoal  for  Khartoum  comes  from  well  over  125  km  away.
In Sudan,  the  present  stumpage  fee  3and  taxes  levied  on the  wood
raw  material  amounts  to about  US$0.50  per  m  with  a slight  increase  for
wood nearer  the  market  (about  US$1.00  per m3).  The  maximum  transport
haulage  distance  for  charcoal  is  about  550  km.  Therefore  if  charcoal  is
being made as efficiently  as assumed  in Figure  2 then the  Government
could  charge  between  US$1.60  (light  truck)  and  2.70  (heavy  truck)  per  m'
from  this  distance  without  in theory  significantly  altering  the  market
price.  This would reduce the excess  profits  of the producers  and
tranporters. Some  transporters  in Sudan  do haul  only  one  way (but  with
large trucks  plus trailer)  therfore  either  the "stumpage"  price  under
these  conditions  appears  to  be zero  or the  haulage  cost assumptions  etc.
are  too  high.  Under  the  above  assumption,  US$7.30  per  m  is  the  maximum
price  that  could be  charged for  charcoal wood and  US$11.70 for
firewood. These  fees  set  the  limits  to investments  that  could  be  made  in
the  growing  of trees  for  woodfuel.  Of course,  with  different  assumptions
and various  markets  for tree  products,  the investment  possibilities  can
vary considerably  in either  direction. What the figures  illustrate  is- 50  -
the  general  principle that  the  stumpage fee  should take  into
consideration  distance  to the  market  and that  the nearer  one is to the
market the greater  the investment  can be in growing  trees.  However,
whether  the stumpage  fees  are  sufficient  to  make  tree  growing  profitable
must  be  worked  out  on  a case  by case  basis.
Figure  1:  SUDAN  1985  MAXIMUM  STUMPAGE  PRICE  FOR  FUELWOOD
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Assumptions:
The cost  of cutting,  extraction  and  delivery  to depot  over  50 Am  of bush
roads  is  US$13.50  per  tonne. The  wholesale  buying  price  at tne  ma  ket is
US$27.50  per tonne.  1 tonne  wood (15%  moisture  content)  = 1.2  round
wood.  Light  truck  6-8  tonnes. Cost  per  tonne  kilometer  US 6 cents  if
goods  carried  in both  directions  and  US 5.4  cents  if goods  only  carried
in one direction  but round  trip mileage  taken  as distance  travelled.
Heavy  truck  25 t. Cost per  t-km  US 5 cents  (both  directions)  and  US 4.5
cents  (one  direction  but  twice  mileage).- 51  -
Figure  2:  SUDAN  1985  MAXIMUM  STUMPAGE  PRICE  FOR  CHARCOAL  WOOD
AT VARYING  DISTANCES  FROM  THE  MARKET
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Assumptions:
Cost of cutting,  charcoal  production  and bagging  US$25.00  per tonne.
Cost  of loading,  bush  transport  for  50 km,  unloading  and  storage  charges
at depot  US$  8.50  per Lonne. Wholesale  selling  price  at the  market  US$
77.50  per  tonne. Charcoal  production:  l  rge  efficient  earth  kiln  using
air dry wood on average  requires  6.0 mi (5 t) to produce  1 tonne  of
saleable  charcoal. Light  truck  6-8  tonnes. Cost  per  tonne-kilometer  US
6 cents if goods  carried  in both  directions  and US 5.4 cents  if goods
only carried  in one direction  but round  trip  mileage  taken  as distance
travelled. Heavy  lorry  - 25  tonnes. Cost  per  tonne-kilometer  US 5 cents
(both  directions)  and  US  4.5  cents  (one  direction  but  twice  mileage).PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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